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# **East Europe**

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# East Europe SUPPLEMENT

JPRS-EER-93-002-S

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### \* Background of CSFR Split Explored

93CH0294A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE (Bilder und Zeiten supplement) in  
German 9 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Berthold Kohler: "Two Deaf-Mute Siblings—  
The Reason for the Breakup of Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] The politicians claimed they actually had not desired it to happen. The intellectuals beat their breasts and failed to understand why they were unable to prevent it from happening. Simple people say they still cannot really believe it. Nowadays, Czechs and Slovaks rarely show any pleasure regarding the dissolution of the common state. The shadow of oppressive anguish rather than the enthusiasm of liberation hangs over the young republics. Why did Czechoslovakia, this apparent model state among the postcommunist reform countries, actually fall apart?

In the concert of the rational with the irrational, which constantly accompanies the history of the Czechoslovak breakup, nothing is more illuminating and at the same time more seductive than the effort to seek the causes (in isolation) in the past. To speak only of a fateful automatism is just as wrong as portraying the division essentially as being the destructive work of two political parties. The feeding ground of the split was prepared by old tensions and contradictions that were never overcome.

### A Marriage of Convenience Is Ordered

The "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic" has fallen apart because neither of its two parts had a sufficient number of federalists who might have wished to preserve it. To overthrow exhausted communism, hundreds of thousands took to the streets; only a few hundred came out in support of the federation. As a state which, according to Masaryk, was born as a matter of "common sense," Czechoslovakia suffered all of its life from the fact that it was never common sense alone that governed it. However, in the end, the fact that the Slovaks failed to see their way free to demonstrate that affirmative emotion which is required to render a community tenable proved to be fatal.

The allies had promoted the special-purpose alliance between the Slovak and Czech "fraternal nations," which was created in 1918, to rearrange Central Europe after the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy, to check German "imperialism," and to erect a bulwark against the bolshevist threat from the east. Czech exiles wanted unification with the Slovaks because there was a fear that they might not be able to prevail on their own in the long simmering conflict with German Czechs. The thin layer of the Slovak intelligentsia, after some hesitation, went along in view of the military pressure also exerted by the Czechs because they perceived it to be a way out of assimilation by the Hungarians, who had hitherto ruled over the Slovaks. Only a few Slovaks today remember that the preservation of Slovak culture is primarily due to the alliance with the Czechs.

The fact that the marriage of convenience in the First Republic did not lead to love is in large measure, however, also attributable to the Czechs. "Czechoslovakism," Masaryk's concept of a single Czechoslovak nation with two

tribes, might have originally been a well-intentioned attempt at integration—however, in practice, it amounted only to a continuation of Czech nationalism using other concepts. On the one hand, there was the only Slovak industrial nation of the time which laid claim to a 1,000-year history; on the other side, there was the agrarian land without any bourgeoisie worth mentioning, whose language had been codified a mere 80 years prior to that time: These were far too disparate requisites for a partnership of equals. Czechoslovakia was a Czech idea; in justifying it, the Czechs had actually always only seen an expansion of their own state territory. In this sense, neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks were Czechoslovaks at that time.

The Czechs performed enormous amounts of social improvement work in Slovakia, both material and also mental in nature. And yet they did so, for the most part, in the manner of colonial masters. To this day, there is a tendency in Bohemia and Moravia to consider the Slovaks in many respects as being backward and, at best, in need of instruction. In Slovakia, this led to a collective feeling of humiliation and an inferiority complex with respect to the Czech "masters." Passed on from generation to generation beneath the apparently smooth surface of an authoritarian regime, this feeling grew into an explosive charge under conditions of freedom. It is primarily the protest against Czech patronization that lends strength to Slovak "nationalism" in the 1990's.

The promises of self-determination and administrative sovereignty that Masaryk made in May 1918 to the Slovak exiles in the Pittsburgh Accords were not fulfilled by Prague during the First Republic; it would have been difficult then to deny the three million Sudeten Germans, who had been kept the right to self-determination at the time the state was being established, quiet. It was the inability of Prague, given the urgency of consolidating the state, to defuse minority questions, and the lack of will to acquiesce to Slovak and Ruthenian autonomy desires, that contributed to the subsequent dismemberment of the republic in the Munich Accords. In Slovakia, opposition to "Pragocentrism" grew.

The fact that the Slovaks, given the choice by Hitler of being partitioned or establishing a vassal state, finally chose the latter course, has not been forgiven them by the Czech populace to this day. The "betrayal" of that time and the reminders of it by the symbols of the second Slovak state is one of the reasons why the Czechs have now become so quickly reconciled with the fact that they are now losing five million fellow citizens. Not even after 1945 were the hopes of Bratislava for a political life of its own fulfilled. The struggle for autonomy, which had been taken up by Hodza with Benes in exile, was definitively lost by the Slovaks as a result of the seizure of power by the Communists. The subsequent formal granting of equal status with the Czech Republic, in the course of the "Prague Spring," which was incorporated in the Constitution of 1969, mocked the paper on which it was written in the subsequent years. The tanks of the Warsaw Pact not only flattened Dubcek's reform efforts, but also rolled over the freshly installed federalism; communism did not tolerate the idea of state-sponsored

individualism. During the time of the "normalization," the old game began anew: Prague governed, Bratislava had nothing to say.

The fact that the Czechs were unable to retain the Slovaks in a common state following the "velvet revolution" has to do with this triple "swindle." The experience, having been put off repeatedly with empty promises, obstructed the Slovak view of the opportunities inherent in the postcommunist era. Once more completely immersed in constant disputes with the Czechs as to who profited more from whom and who was exploited by whom, the Slovaks overlooked the fact after 1989 that never before had there been better prerequisites for reaching a just settlement between both nations.

The inability, under the conditions of freedom, to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a joint state once more, casts light upon the lack of communication which has characterized the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks since 1918. Pithart, historian and former Czech prime minister, calls both nations, whose communication had not gone beyond the banal, "deaf-mute siblings."

#### **An Offer To Talk Comes Too Late**

The postrevolutionary attempts made by Vaclav Havel to come to an understanding in the streets of Bratislava came too late; this was proven by the eggs thrown at him. In Prague, it had always been difficult to understand the high value the young Slovak nation placed on self-determination and statehood and the degree of desperation with which their own identity was being sought in the east. The Slovak question was actually always understood by Prague only as a subtopic involved in the turning points of Czech history: After World War I, it was the all-overshadowing conflict with the Germans; after World War II, it was the struggle for or against communism; after the fall of communism, it was the decision for or against the Western system.

In the general revolution which followed 1989, the Czechs were, thus, almost bound to underestimate the power of the Slovak striving for independence and a greater international profile; most Prague politicians have, in the meantime, admitted this. The opportunities of 1990 and 1991 for renewal of the federation were inadequately utilized. People became lost in the "hyphen dispute" (involving the name of Czecho-Slovakia) and in the dispute regarding jurisdictions and the mounting danger to the entire enterprise was not fully recognized. The plan by Carnogursky, former Slovak prime minister, for using a state treaty between the two republics to defer the separation and to agree to a "marriage for a test period" was rejected in Prague.

Why did the Czechs not seize this last rescue anchor? Some did not do so because they could not believe that the Slovaks, who had already repeatedly shied away from defection, would really dare to go. Others, who represented a rapidly growing group, were opposed because they had "had enough" of the quarrels and perceived Slovakia, in the interim, as an economic and political burden.

Czechoslovakia also broke up because, after the "velvet revolution," both of its parts were developing apart—

politically as well as economically. Whereas the Czechs, who had been committed to egalitarianism since Jan Hus, made use of an arabesque of history by placing Vaclav Klaus, a high priest of "market economy without attributes," at the helm, the Catholic-conservative Slovaks, who had been secularized by socialism, elected a restrained reform course. Like the Czechs, the Slovaks had also come to terms with communism; it was only when the smaller of the republics became one of the armories of the Warsaw Pact that it transformed itself into an industrial society which even today prefers to follow state-controlled models rather than liberal models. Consequently, the Slovaks were soon grumbling over the neocapitalist reformers of Prague.

The election victories by Klaus and Meciar showed that both societies desire different things: The cool and calculating Czechs, favored by geography, by the rudimentary traditions of an industrial bourgeoisie, and by old foreign policy contacts, are risking the leap toward the West. The more emotionally defined Slovaks, lacking the certitudes of a long tradition of statehood, having no experienced leadership stratum, and being without any appreciable foreign sponsors, are afraid of that.

Yet, the historical burdens and the political and economic differences themselves would not have led so quickly to the end of Czechoslovakia if two antagonists who guided the unstructured emotions and forces in a clear direction had not found each other. Czechoslovakia disintegrated so rapidly because the postrevolutionary elites wanted it so—or at least bought into the disintegration with approval. The federation broke up so rapidly because the Czech Klaus, the homo economicus, for all intents and purposes, has a vision which does not necessarily include the preservation of the joint state. The federal state, which was democratizing itself, survived for only a little more than three years because the Slovak power politician Meciar, forced by Klaus to choose, preferred to be master of a poorhouse rather than being the deputy of a factory director.

Meciar's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), made use of the perpetual Slovak dilemma—striving for "freedom" and fear of freedom, to give birth to the idea of "confederation"—which, from the Slovak standpoint, was an ideal solution because it had the psychological and political advantages of statehood, along with the economic and military security of a dual state. Klaus rejected such a structure as being nonviable and dangerous to the reform process. In the final analysis, the proposal failed because it overestimated the Czechoslovakism of the Czechs and their government. Klaus, who is the personification and projection of the Czech longing for prosperity and efficiency, wanted to save the federation on the basis of a rational calculus, but his heart was not in it.

Klaus wanted to find his place in the history books as the man who took an ailing Czechoslovakia and by introducing a market economy turned it again into a flourishing land. As he recognized following the elections in June that the political and economic developments in Slovakia might slow down the attainment of this goal if they were not directly endangering it, he limited his historical claims to the Czech Republic: He became a separatist.

The Czechs did not exactly embrace their new prime minister, because they are more concerned nowadays with materialism rather than with historical awareness. Five decades of totalitarian regime had left behind a "completely equalized society which lacked orientation" which no longer knew how it should conduct itself with respect to the state; this was a diagnosis made by Prague philosopher Ladislav Hejdanek in regard to his surroundings. People had allegedly forgotten that they lived within a story. Fatigued by the constant dispute and with a hurt pride, a growing number of Czechs turned their backs on Slovakia. The "never ending" complaints and accusations from the east were said by popular perceptions to have been tolerated long enough. Even the Czech left, which, in the final analysis, was the sole real defender of the joint state, did so only in opposition against Klaus; Meciar later confirmed that no one in Prague could be found to be a partner for the confederation idea.

He, the Slovak people's tribune, did also not find himself at the head of a state by accident. Some people justify his ascendancy by citing Slovak nationalism, which had been liberated from the communist yoke; but a reference to the Slovak inferiority complex is already sufficient. Meciar was not so much elected for what he said, but for how he said it. This man with a not completely transparent past won the elections because he represented the "true Slovak" for the broad masses more so than any of his competitors—personifying an individual who would show the Hungarians—but particularly the Czechs—that the small country between the Morava River and the Carpathian Mountains would have to be reckoned with. Still federalistically inclined during his first brief term as prime minister, Meciar made the Slovak need for emancipation from the Czechs his own when his second term started; on this, he based his attack against his personal and political opponents in Prague and in Bratislava.

#### **A Divorce Is Being Accelerated**

Meciar then no longer gave up on his demand for Slovak independence. It is being said in Prague that his bad luck was alleged to have been the fact that Klaus took him at his

word. Attainment of statehood, this fixed point of Slovak strivings for identity and visibility, in the long run weighed more than the great fear of an uncertain future, replete with great economic and geostrategic risks. At a time when Estonians and Slovenians were given their own state, many Slovaks who were actually opposed to the separation of Slovakia from the Czechs, saw a last chance to reach for their own national state. Many Slovaks retroactively perceived this as the true meaning and purpose of the "velvet revolution."

Finally, the political and personnel contradictions of Klaus and Meciar symbolize the different desires and fears which separate Czechs from Slovaks, despite all they have in common. It is thus wrong to accuse both of the prime ministers of engaging in a sort of stab-in-the-back assassination of the common state, as the opposition likes to do. Both of them were catalysts, but not triggers of the reaction. If Klaus and Meciar had not existed, the end would presumably not have come so quickly, but it would also not have been so smooth. The federation might have dragged on for some time to come; the political paralysis would not have abated; in the end, there would probably have been even greater dangers and risks awaiting both nations than is the case at present.

Would have, might have, could have. Unreality does not apply in the political business, said Meciar in response to the question whether, in view of the rapid progress of the separation at the end, developments had not slipped from his grasp or whether, if he had to do it over again, he would have pursued another policy? Nevertheless, the prime minister was unable to completely escape the power of suggestion of these considerations. If Napoleon could fight the battle of Waterloo again, he would not have deployed his troops in so isolated a manner, the Slovak general conjectured on an impulse which does not identify him as a determinist. The politicians say that they had actually not wanted it to happen. Nevertheless, the battle has been fought and a merciful second chance does not exist in history.

**\* Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria Interviewed**

*93BA0424A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 22 Dec 92 p 7*

[Interview with Aleksandr Avdeyev, Russian ambassador to Bulgaria, by Ivanka Khlebarova; place and date not given: "Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev Talks to DUMA"]

[Text] [Khlebarova] How are the bilateral relations developing after our country signed and ratified the Bulgarian-Russian agreement?

[Avdeyev] The agreement, signed by Presidents Zhelev and Yeltsin, provided a very good stimulus for the new relations that are presently forming on a completely equal basis and that correspond to both Bulgaria's and Russia's interests. I would like to call attention to the specifics we will be working on together with our Bulgarian partners for the development of all aspects of the bilateral relations. As far as I have been informed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, the parliament's chairman, the question of ratifying the agreement will be one of the first tasks of the Supreme Council's upcoming session.

We now want to establish a truly developed legal basis for all aspects of cooperation. We must review all existing agreements, treaties, and conventions between the former Soviet Union and your country so that they can be updated. Here it is necessary to make, as the economists say, an inventory of our legal agreement documents. This will be started on 22 December 1992 by a group of expert diplomats who will come from Moscow and, together with our Bulgarian colleagues, will examine the documents.

The second important thing we expect is the session of the Bulgarian and Russian intergovernmental commission. It should have taken place in November, but because of the government crisis in Bulgaria and the crisis situation in Russia, the session did not take place and will probably have to be held in January or February. There is a group of experts who will come to Bulgaria to prepare for this session.

[Khlebarova] What questions will be discussed at the session of the intergovernmental commission?

[Avdeyev] First of all there are the questions on mutual payments; in Bulgaria they are called "mutual debts." These debts are quite complicated because they are both in hard currency and in transferable rubles. A common denominator must be found for them and they must be taken care of. We are interested in taking care of this as soon as possible.

The second question that will be discussed at the session is trade for 1993.

Also, the question of enabling businessmen from both countries to make payments in their national currencies will be discussed.

The transportation problem is very important. At this time goods cannot be transported quickly from one country to the other because there is no direct sea link, and by land the territory of three countries that demand very high duties must be crossed. Also, there is no security along this long path. President Yeltsin has ordered speedy drafting of the

technical and economic documents to establish a transportation link between Varna and Novorosiysk. This is very expensive, you understand, but it must be done by March or April, so probably a decision will be made at the next session of the intergovernmental commission.

The next step is the drafting of two bilateral documents: an agreement to avoid double taxation and one for mutual protection of investments. They will help in the development of contacts between private businessmen and the various associations.

[Khlebarova] How are political relations developing?

[Avdeyev] The political relations are developing very favorably. I am convinced that when we speak of Bulgaria's national interests, parliamentary members understand that good and equal relations with Russia are necessary. In our parliament, regardless of the sharp criticism regarding our foreign policy, it is understood that it is important for Russia to retain its traditional historical ties with Bulgaria.

[Khlebarova] There are some who accuse you, nevertheless, of continuing Russia's imperialist policy in the Balkans.

[Avdeyev] Russia has changed with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and, together with this, our totalitarian policy has changed. I have noticed that some who accuse Russia act as if they are criticizing the old Soviet Union. The image of the old Union and its arrogant Big Brother policy has been preserved in their minds. This is why I think the embassy should inform your society as much as possible about our foreign policy's new principles and about the development of the democratic process in our country in general. It is puzzling that some politicians who are followers of democratic reforms criticize Russia. Is it possible that people, including people in Bulgaria, do not see the powerful democratic transformations and continue to accuse Moscow of some totalitarian acts and state arrogance? We are in the process of overcoming this, but some refuse to acknowledge it and continue to criticize us. It is obvious that they are not up to date about the situation.

[Khlebarova] Has your attitude regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia changed?

[Avdeyev] Our line regarding the Balkans is based on the principle that the area must be a region of peace. This is not the place for the great powers to seek influence. Through dialogue and mutual compromises within the framework of the UN and the CSCE, all aspects of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia will be eliminated. We feel that one of the elements of peace in the region is the recognition of Macedonia. All Balkan nations must retain their common sense, wisdom, and restraint in the search for compromises. We value highly that the Turkish Government, by offering its initiatives, is acting together with the other countries from the UN and the CSCE in the search for compromise for a peaceful solution. In this respect we feel it is very important and useful and we value highly the existing dialogue between Bulgaria and Turkey, which focuses on finding a solution for the crisis in the region.

[Khlebarova] Has your opposition in the Congress of People's Deputies raised the question of eliminating the sanctions against Serbia?

[Avdeyev] You must keep in mind that we have the president's foreign policy, which is supported by parliament as a whole, regardless of individual critical notes made by the opposition. Russia has its own national interests in the

Balkans. The main thing is the development of ample bilateral relations with all Balkan countries and the transformation of the Balkans into a region of stability and peace, and development of trade and economic cooperation.

The fate of the sanctions is in the hands of the Serbian leaders, both present and future ones, and it depends on their wisdom, sense, and willingness to compromise.



**\* Television To Be Divided, Privatized****\* Problems Explained**

93CH0249A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
22 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Jan Vavra, staff member of Radio Free Europe:  
"The Battle Over Television"]

[Text] According to statistics 76 percent of the populace of the CR [Czech Republic] prefers watching television over other methods of spending their free time. Television thus has the dominant position not only among means of communication. Without any exaggeration it can be said that what appears on the screen is more real for the majority of people than reality itself. Understandably, it seems that the politicians above all are aware of the importance of television.

The law which has been in effect to date presumed that there would be two area-wide channels (F 1 and CTV), the so-called operators by law. OK 3, covering about 35 percent of the CR's territory, is designated for private broadcasting. Channel F 1 was until now run by the CST [Czechoslovak Television], which is a state institution where the director is appointed by the government. With the disappearance of federal television, the administration of all three channels will come into the hand of one enterprise, Czech Television. It has the status of an institution established by public law and the director is elected by the Czech Television Council, which answers to the CNR [Czech National Council]. Of course, at the last meeting of the CNR there was a deputy's proposal submitted for updating the law to make it possible to operate private broadcasting on one of the two area-wide channels as well. The Council of the Czech Republic for Radio and Television Broadcasting is supposed to decide which one that will be and which one will, on the contrary, remain Czech Television by no later than 31 January 1993.

Why is there going to be this limiting of public television to one channel, which is unique among the European countries as well? According to the person who submitted the proposal to the chairman of the CNR commission for means of communication, Vladimir Koronthaly, "If we want to create any kind of alternative model at all, we much detach ourselves from both area-wide channels. Because of its range, OK 3 can serve only, shall we say, regional private operators. But if we are going to let private parties into broadcasting, it is always better to let two in."

Of course, the leadership and the Czech Television Council simply do not agree with this view. Jiri Grygar, the chairman of the Council, says, "The current law places a number of tasks on Czech Television. If it is to carry them out, it needs two area-wide channels. The Czech Television Council presumes that it is itself capable of checking up on the balanced nature of reporting so that a monopoly is not created."

This capability has lately been cast somewhat in doubt, particularly in the parliament. Czech Television is moreover engaged in a basic argument about this problem with the CR's Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting. Its

chairman Daniel Korte states, "I do not assume that a plurality should mean that one entity would be broadcast everywhere. A plurality means that there will be a number of broadcasting entities and today this is truly what is needed."

But the government has also entered into the battle over television. It has attempted, strangely enough with the support of the creators themselves, to set up state television, or at least television with state participation. Luckily the view of the majority of the deputies to the CNR is rather the contrary. Vladimir Koronthaly says, "Such a mass medium is designed simply to ensure that all the citizens think the same thing about matters as the government itself does. I assume, of course, that a citizen of the CR is capable enough of making his own judgments that he will not require this assistance."

The government can, however, try—and has already tried—to limit the activities of independent institutions like the CR's Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, but inconspicuously. For example, by a significant limiting of the resources for its operations, particularly if it is dependent on the state budget. In order for the Council to become a true spokesperson for the television viewers, the law should award it 1 percent of the licensing fees.

The fact that the Czech prime minister does not even hesitate to call in to the public television and ask why in the world his visit to one of the Balkan countries was not broadcast as the lead news item testifies to the real need for the protection of independent institutions overseeing the objectivity of television.

A private operator will of course need a period longer than one year to prepare for broadcasting. During that time all three channels will carry the programs of a single entity, Czech Television. In this situation, how can we introduce a competitive environment, at least as far as reporting is concerned? The law defines a model of a director and two supervisors for each of the two channels. The supervisors are appointed by the Czech Television Council based on nominations by the director and both are, together of course with the director, responsible to the Council for Independent Reporting for their network. Here as well, unfortunately, there is a conflict between the deputies and the Czech Television Council, which considers the institution of supervisors superfluous.

A solution could be, however, the actual economic independence of the supervisors and their relationship with Czech Television on an economic basis.

Competitive management at OK 3 is, of course, already taking place and this victory should be recognized at the beginning of January of next year. Issuing a license to a private operator, however, hides a number of dangerous reefs. First of all, to build up a private channel takes roughly a billion. It is hard to round up that kind of money exclusively from domestic sources. The Council's experience only confirms that. Daniel Korte comments, "The majority of applicants with whom we have come into contact have modestly and shyly kept quiet about their sources. They probably imagine that they will get the license and then they will try to sell off 49 percent."

The greatest problem is thus to find out what serious partner is hiding behind what capital. It is a matter of nothing less than a question of who will have influence on this medium in the future, one which is so popular in the Czech lands. On the other hand, Czech capital is much less transparent than foreign capital. Here there is moreover the threat of a considerable danger of it being tied in with political parties, which the independent nature of private television should exclude right from the start. In doing this, it does not have to be a matter of just the left-wing parties, as the case of one quite influential applicant shows.

Each member of the Council thus will be subjected to various pressures which in every case will be significant. Obviously it will primarily depend on his resistance and courage. Of course, the criteria and the seriousness of the individual offers should be a matter of public information as much as possible. Only thus is it possible at least to limit the political and other pressures and to ensure that only the truly best one can win within the framework of a fair competition. The license is, after all, granted for 12 years and the victory can influence the mental climate in this country for a number of years to come.

P.S. The Czech National Council yesterday afternoon did not approve the deputy's proposal for a law on television broadcasting.

#### \* Parliament's Decision

93CH0249B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
23 Dec 92 pp 1, 8

[Article signed by cipher (sb, rk): "For the First Days of Illness"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Yesterday the CNR [Czech National Council] returned to a discussion of the law by which radio and television broadcasting after the disappearance of the federal mass media will be resolved and which the Chamber of Deputies did not approve on Monday. A modified deputy's proposal was finally approved by a large majority. Its essence is the division of the two area-wide channels between private and public television. The Council of the Czech Republic for Radio and Television Broadcasting will decide no later than 31 Jan 1993 on which network will belong to the Czech Television. The other CT [Czech Television] network will be OK 3 until 31 Dec 1995. The CNR approved the modifying proposal of V. Budinsky (ODS [Civic Democratic Party]) that on the channel designated for privatization the time allocated for advertising can reach 7 percent of the daily transmission time. On the two remaining channels which the CT will operate, advertising is not allowed to exceed 1 percent of the transmission time, in accordance with the original proposal

#### \* Press Commentary

93CH0249C Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
24 Dec 92 p 1

[Commentary by Jan Foll: "Snow on the Television"]

[Text] After 1 January the views of the surviving federal network will not see snow on their television screens, but the regular programming. The CNR [Czech National Council] deputies the day before yesterday decided the first round of the prolonged argument over the privatization of the television channels. Today's F 1, which in a week will become CT [Czech Television] 2, would not have stopped transmitting of course even if they had not achieved or had not wanted an agreement. The programming offered for the first day of January shows that Czech Television was thinking mainly about the viewer. The statement by Deputy Zemina published after the stalled discussion on Monday was therefore exaggerated, to say the least....

To keep things in good order, we will repeat the compromise verdict from two evenings ago. Czech Television as an institution set up by public law will continue to transmit on the present area-wide CTV channel, which after 1 January will become the "first program" called CT 1. The main news programs, including the "Diary" at 1930 which will in the future be called "Events," will be shifted over to it. The present area-wide F 1 network will be privatized in the future and will only temporarily remain under the administration of Czech Television. That organization will also manage the OK 3 channel until 1995 or until there are other arrangements made by law.

One can mull over and speculate the meaning of this for a long time. The snarl of terminology, opposing viewpoints, and political frictions in corridors does not, however, interest the everyday viewer. He is also not curious about whether the government or the prime minister will have "his own ripple" on the wavelengths, for which Vaclav Klaus recently applied to the broadcast frequencies in a somewhat authoritarian manner. For their licensing fees the viewers want mainly entertainment and good quality reporting from the television and the more cultured ones want somewhat more as well.

Public television is at a disadvantage as compared to the "independents"; everyone swears at it and all kinds of people have recipes for improving it. To suppose that the competition of private operators will resolve everything like the visiting performance of a great actor is, of course, an illusion. Moreover, the majority of the "independents" serve up only showy specials from which they can easily and quickly make money. We can have nothing against that, but the public television must operate rather like a factory dining hall which serves us daily.

I do not want to cast doubt on the so-called dual system, that is, the coexistence of public and private television. It would not, after all, do any factory dining hall harm to come up with a better way to prepare the meals and use fewer employees, while on the other hand the private restaurants should take greater care with the everyday menu. Both saturate things with their condiments. However, at the moment only Czech Television is the guarantee against the presence of snow on the television screens.

**\* Csurka's Views Defended; Justice Called For**  
 93CH0278A Budapest KAPU in Hungarian Dec 92  
 pp 9-12

[Article by Albert Beke: "Let Us Kick the Soapbox Out From Under the Press (Desultory Reflections on Our Internal Political Life)"]

[Text] *"What we need today is a militant humanism, one that discovers its own manhood and is filled with the realization that the principles of justice, tolerance, and doubt must not let themselves be exploited and overrun by a fanaticism that knows neither modesty nor doubt."* (Thomas Mann)

Our internal political life is extremely depressing and even exasperating. The government is not showing at all the strength we expected of it. Sometimes we get the impression that the government is downright weak and hesitant. Whereas the opposition, aware of its foreign connections, is less and less inhibited in aspiring to power, and is behaving in every area as if it had won the elections. In the press, and on radio and television, the opposition is lying the most vulgarly—today that is called "insinuation"—and is libeling and slandering not just the government, but the Hungarian nation as well. The Communists, the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], the Smallholders intoxicated from Torgyan's demagoguery, and the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] have joined forces to slander and libel the nation's center parties, and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] in particular.

The Hungarians who engage in politics are so divided that decades-old friendships are breaking up over different party affiliations. Sometimes such political antagonism poisons the air even within families. There are, of course, those self-proclaimed very wise who are saying that in the West—in the civilized West!—things are different. There two people would not face each other with hostility just because each belongs to a different political party. But the self-professed very wise who talk like this forget one thing: In the West, both of those persons would be, say, Germans or Frenchmen. And neither would dream of labeling as fascist the other's political party, or the leader of that party, in the U.S. Congress, for instance. Nor of publishing in the foreign press libelous articles about the country whose citizen he happens to be. But in Hungary, unfortunately, such occurrences are practically commonplace. That is why, in our country, no two persons belonging to different political parties are able to sit down peacefully to drink beer together. The first one would call the other one a country bumpkin whose feet stink. And the other one would feel that the first one perhaps does not even regard Hungary as his homeland, but merely as the site of his activity.

On the basis of certain indications, we may assume that some people will most likely either leave the MDF in January or be expelled from it. For instance, the Jozsef Debreczeni who has called one of his party's vice presidents, namely Istvan Csurka, a Nazi and fascist can hardly remain a member of that party. And on top of everything, Debreczeni did this in NEPSZABADSAG, one of the newspapers most hostile to the MDF!

No, there can be no excuse for this. We must make perfectly clear that with this standpoint Jozsef Debreczeni has not only betrayed his party, but has also been guilty of telling one of the biggest lies. For this he can expect congratulations not just from the Communists, but from the liberal bolsheviks as well. However, a person may question one or another of Csurka's statements and disagree with him, but only the most vile calumniator or a pathological liar could call him a Nazi or fascist. Or else the person concerned is so stupid that he does not have the faintest idea of what he is talking about. Moreover, 85 to 90 percent of Csurka's statements are correct!

Incidentally, anyone who might have had even the slightest doubt about the existence of the New York, Paris, and Tel Aviv contacts Csurka mentioned, for instance, must have been fairly convinced by the immediate appearance of Tom Lantos in Budapest. That was the most brilliant confirmation of Csurka's statement. For Tom Lantos has not only interfered rudely in Hungary's internal affairs, but has also threatened us with the promise of adverse publicity in the United States. And since he has kept his promise, we may safely say that he has almost succeeded in presenting Hungary as a country where anti-Semitism is spreading virulently, and where it is possible to disseminate Nazi and fascist ideas with impunity. Lantos called Csurka a Nazi and fascist as if that were a self-evident truth requiring neither proof nor demonstration. I am surprised that Tom Lantos dared to tell such a lie. Could he have done so in his own interest, with his Californian constituency in mind?

Of course, Tom Lantos allowed himself also the impertinence of declaring on Hungarian TV that Csurka would have to be on his best behavior for a good many years before his essay is forgotten. I do not know what Mr. Lantos would say if a Hungarian MP were to make such a statement about a congressman on U.S. TV. And I wonder whether U.S. TV networks would allow such a statement to be broadcast?

What the opposition now would have liked to see was Csurka's spectacular removal from his position as a vice president of the MDF, while the moderates—and primarily Jozsef Antall, of course—were attempting to distance themselves even more clearly from him. Instead of removing Csurka, however, the MDF very wisely decided to abolish the positions of vice presidents, until the party's national convention in January. Thus Csurka has not suffered any loss of prestige. What Jozsef Debreczeni and the other so-called "national liberals" like him—they of course have nothing in common with the classical national liberalism of Eotvos and Deak—tend to forget is "merely" the fact that an overwhelming majority of the MDF membership stands behind Csurka, and therefore it may be regarded as almost certain that the party members will reelect him to the party's leadership in January. Consequently, the only possible solution will be for Jozsef Debreczeni, Imre Furmann, Istvan Elek, Tibor Balazsi, and their few followers to leave the MDF, because there is no way the party could possibly go into the next election in its present internal division, or at least with its present internal tensions. For who would vote for the party in that situation? A voter would not know whether he was casting his ballot for Debreczeni or Csurka.

Naturally, the big question is how many MDF deputies would follow Debreczeni and his comrades? In other words, how many MP's would leave the MDF caucus? A minority government would not be able to govern even so, because actual power would then be held by the opposition, but without having to bear any of the responsibility!

The other big problem is that the "national liberals" and the liberal bolsheviks would brand the entire MDF as Nazi and fascist, if merely Csurka and his followers—in other words, the populist-nationalists—and the Christian Democrats were to remain in the party. But I am convinced that the MDF should not recoil in horror from this threat. It should take up the fight against this flood of filthy libel and slander, for only that way will it be able to acquire a definite profile and to show strength. In other words, the government should not be on the defensive, but should switch to vigorous counterattack.

Unfortunately, the government is weak, extremely weak. We have no way of knowing, of course, what fears lie behind this weakness. But the view is fairly widespread that dependence on foreign capital is behind it.

Meanwhile the processes are snowballing in succession. For months now, the country's political public opinion has been kept in a flutter of excitement by the wrangling over the replacement of the presidents of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television. Many people fail to understand, or pretend to be unable to understand, the entire commotion, and keep repeating in demagogic fashion that the government would do better to concern itself with the poor. Whereas the government is doing nothing else than concerning itself with the poor. But the masses are unaware of this, because on radio and television they are being told the exact opposite. The media are as silent as the grave about the government's successes, because it is not in the opposition's interest to enlighten the public about them.

The media war began in late September when Hungarian TV President Elemer Hankiss dismissed in outrageous fashion Istvan G. Palfy, the editor in chief of *Hirado* and *A Het*—i.e., the boss of the two programs that were fair and objective, and refused to join the TV programs that were abusing the government. With Palfy's dismissal, all Hungarian TV was in the hands of the liberal bolsheviks. Among the key personnel, only Alajos Chrudinak had not joined the liberal bolsheviks, but Hankiss soon fired him as well.

The part of the nation that supports the government now expected the cabinet to respond in a worthy manner—i.e., to find a way to remove both Hankiss and Gombar from office, and to appoint government commissioners to manage Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio. But what happened? There was merely an announcement by Tamas Katona that the government might consider withdrawing the media bill that it had introduced in parliament. (In the end, however, the government failed to do even that much.)

Thus the government failed once again to dig in its heels. And this was so depressing that growing disillusionment and lethargy began to take hold of even the most determined government supporters. The government surrendered its

last positions and lost the media completely, thereby contributing unwittingly to the alienation of ever larger masses from politics. Meanwhile, fierce passions are smoldering against Hankiss and Gombar, as well as against the inimical forces hiding behind them. For here we have ceased to deal with opponents long ago, and have been dealing with outright enemies instead. Consequently, the government should have launched a determined counterattack against them long ago, because what is at stake here is not just the possible victory or defeat of the MDF, but the rescuing of democracy itself, since it is obviously in mortal danger. Andras Bencsik was right when he wrote the following in the 8 September issue of *PESTI HIRLAP*: "By now it would be possible to gain control of radio and television only through terror. But terror breeds more terror... It can be only parliament's task to mobilize society for warding off the peril threatening democracy, and to regain by legal means from the bolshevik hard core the most dangerous weapons of our time—namely the mass media. It is the nation itself, rather than the ruling party or the opposition, that needs radio and television today. The nation is now in peril. May it never be revealed how extreme that peril is."

But the government appears to be regaining its strength at long last. As of this writing—i.e., on 12 December—we are at the point where Hankiss has been suspended from his position as the president of Hungarian TV. Furthermore, "on well-founded suspicion of their having committed the felony of misappropriating a particularly large amount of funds, the government has filed criminal complaints against Laszlo Nagy, Hungarian Television's director general for economic affairs, and Gabor Banyai, the superintendent of TV Channel 1" (*PESTI HIRLAP*, 11 Dec 92).

We hope that this time the government will finally be able to get rid of Hankiss. But that still leaves Csaba Gombar, the president of Hungarian Radio. For it is no exaggeration to say that the propaganda Hungarian radio is churning out against a real change of political systems is even more harmful than Hungarian Television's propaganda. One wonders how Gombar could be removed. The big problem here is not just President Arpad Goncz, but also the fact that the MDF is collapsing as a result of the "national liberals" despicable internal betrayal, and it will be able to arise from its prostration only if the populist-nationalist wing led by Csurka gains strength. Although the departure of the "liberals" could pose many hazards, the MDF will nevertheless have to distance itself from them in the last year before next election, and Jozsef Antall will have to confront this most painful decision.

Naturally, I am assuming that the party president is closer to Csurka than to Debreczeni. But this much is certain: Jozsef Antall and the other moderates cannot long delay a definite decision, because they are running out of time. And it is quite obvious that not the moderates, but the populist-nationalists—in other words, Csurka's supporters—are in a majority within the MDF, or at least among its members. It is naive to hope that the moderates will eventually be able to tame Csurka and his followers. To the contrary! The moderates will have to decide which camp to join: the populist-nationalist tendency that expresses the interests of the

nation's overwhelming majority, or the alleged liberals. The members are expecting an unequivocal and resolute action program from the party, one that expresses and radiates strength, and not some lukewarm middle of the road that leads nowhere. Or more accurately, it does lead, but not where the members want to go.

The moderates are unlikely to see eye to eye with the backers of the Liberal Forum Foundation, who have clearly stated: "We believe that national sentiment, in the same way as one's relationship with God, is first of all a personal matter" (MAGYAR NEMZET, 24 Sep 92). I think it is preposterous to assume that Jozsef Antall could ever identify with this monstrous lie.

It is certain that mainly Arpad Goncz must bear the primary and immense responsibility for the country's political division—i.e., for the present tragic situation. He has been repeatedly and openly derelict of his constitutional duties and has clearly sided with the opposition. Jozsef Antall must have suffered many disappointments during the past two years, but the greatest one among them has probably been Arpad Goncz. But then many of Goncz's one-time companions-in-arms have likewise been disappointed in him.

But who is "handling" Goncz? It is not difficult to guess the answer, because it is quite obvious that Goncz is being manipulated by the SZDSZ, and within it specifically by the hard core whose members, as Andras Bencsik writes, "came from the Network. In case someone has failed to identify them already, they include Miklos Haraszti, Gyorgy Konrad, Laszlo Rajk, Jr., Gabor Ivanyi, Gabor Demuszky, Tamas Fodor, Ferenc Koszeg, Janos Kis, Otilia Solt, and others. The list, of course, is incomplete. Just as there obviously are different degrees of initiation within the core itself. They have been and are building their power base invisibly, yet with incredible effectiveness, and preparing the ground for assuming power sometime in the future, but then the takeover will be final."

Therefore it is quite natural that radio, television, and also the press, 90 percent of which is in the hands of these liberal gentlemen, extol Arpad Goncz to the skies. And why not? After all, he is the one who has prevented the punishing of murderers and traitors; we can thank him for the victory of the law, but the defeat of justice. He seems to be drawing a distinction between fascist murderers and communist ones. Prosecution of those who were responsible for the holocaust is not barred by the statute of limitations, but to prosecute the Communist murderers and traitors for their crimes would have offended Arpad Goncz's refined sense of justice.

In 1959 (!), at the age of 78, Mihaly Francia Kis could be hanged for crimes he had committed in 1919. But Gyorgy Marosan and his accomplices cannot be—well, not hanged, but at least given token sentences—because the statute of limitations bars, doesn't it, their prosecution. Aside from that, they are already old; and why not let bygones be bygones, and let us love one another, children.

Hell, No! A thousand times No! Peace and resignation will never reside in the hearts of people here, as long as murderers and traitors are allowed to walk about freely and undisturbed. Ever more people are comparing Jozsef

Antall's style of leadership with Mihaly Karolyi's soft and accommodating politics that eventually led to tragedy. Jozsef Antall made a serious mistake by his failure to remove from the media, immediately upon gaining power, the Communist system's principal scandalmongers. It was serious negligence on the government's part not to place Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television under its control. After 40 years of dictatorship, it is not possible to start playing democracy immediately, especially not against those who practiced that dictatorship. First their backs should have been broken firmly, before switching gradually to democratic government.

Let us also remember that, on the issue of Trianon, the liberal press most often occupied standpoints which already amounted to affronting the nation. I am amazed that none of the MP's in the ruling party has introduced as yet a bill that would punish affronts to the nation. Such a law is necessary and long overdue! It is shocking that certain liberal bolshevik journalists are pursuing practically as a sport the libeling and slandering of the Hungarian nation abroad.

Anticlericalism, for example, is also one of the forms in which antinationalism manifests itself. Because, to quote Kunszabo once again: "They promise light comedy, but you see them ridiculing the pastor, faith, and religion; they want to continue destroying in you the moral precepts that make you a human being and a Hungarian." Although a Law on the Restoration of Church Property has been enacted, the liberal press never fails to cry out in consternation, and to remain reproachful for weeks and even months at a time, whenever a venerable church school reverts to church administration. Yet it is clear as crystal that church schools offer their students something extra that state schools are never able to provide.

Another typical manifestation of anti-Hungarianism is that the press is keeping the false accusation of anti-Semitism constantly on the front burner, whereas Gabor Balla is entirely right in that "anti-Jewish sentiment is a mendacious generalization, because what we have here is actually the unrestrained anti-Hungarianism of certain Jewish individuals and circles. And in many instances, merely common crimes committed by persons who are Jews. That is why they are using the obfuscating concept of anti-Semitism, in a generalization that includes all Jews."

Sometimes the press writes about Hungary as if there were even pogroms here. Linked to this is the voicing of accusations of hatred directed against Gypsies, foreigners, and minorities. At the same time, certain bolshi journalists maintain a profound silence about the rising crime rate among Gypsies. Not so long ago, the press created practically a lynching mood against a policeman, merely because he made public the statistical fact that crimes are committed mostly by Gypsies. The Romany Parliament expects Hungarians to love Gypsies. But how can that be expected of the residents of Nadudvar, for instance? In winter a few years ago, they discovered that the denizens of Gypsy row were stealing for firewood all the wooden grave markers in the Kocsordos Cemetery. Finally the residents erected grave markers made of metal, because those could not be used for

fuel. Naturally, anyone who dares to report this is immediately branded a racist. The Romany Parliament would do better to enlighten the Gypsies of Nadudvar that burning grave markers is something that just is not done.

It is perverse mendacity to allege that Hungarians hate foreigners. After all, Hungary has always been a receiving country since the time of St. Stephen and remains one even today. The best formulation of our attitude to foreigners was provided by Dezso Szabo and remains valid to this day: "Here I say openly: Let there come every pure intention of whatever bloodline, every powerful idea of whatever ancestry, every heroic determination of whatever parentage, into the industrious unity of Hungarian effort, the Hungarian language, and Hungarian future. Let ours be the widest embrace of mankind, and let our performance be filled with men of every color. I do not desire that anyone of foreign blood be disadvantaged at the Hungarian hearth. I merely request that not being a Hungarian should not give anyone an advantage."

And who is a foreigner? Not necessarily anyone who came here from abroad, but mainly and primarily anyone who hates Hungarians. "Let us state clearly at long last that anyone who openly attempts to undermine the Hungarian nation, secretly plots, makes false accusations, or spreads hate against it, or commits unpatriotic acts here at home or abroad, is not a Hungarian, despite being born here or speaking Hungarian." This clear and straightforward language is from Gabor Balla, and to it he has added: "Anyone who does not wish to share the Hungarian nation's fate, or to embrace its traditions and values, has no business being here. We hope that this fundamental civic obligation will eventually be enshrined in the Constitution. As for those who belong to national minorities or other ethnic groups, their only obligation is to refrain from anti-Hungarian subversion, while living their own identities."

Why is the bolshevik press libeling the Hungarian nation while spreading liberal-cosmopolitan cultural garbage? And why does it want to discredit the government? Because, and solely because, this government is made up of democratic parties dedicated to nationalist ideas, and its ideology is based on Christian ethics. Therefore it is obvious that this press, which operates in practice on the tacit principle of the more the better, will do everything possible to discredit this government before the nation and the entire world, and to bring it down. For instance, it is spreading the rumor that everyone in this country is living in fear: the members of minority groups, the one-time party members, the teachers, the Jews, the foreign students studying in this country, the retired persons, the unemployed—in sum, everybody. If one were to take the press seriously, he could gain the impression that we are back again in the good old 1950's.

In fact, what one has to fear is neither this government nor the populist-nationalist wing of the MDF, but the increasingly aggressive "liberal" left. And those who are lying the exact opposite know this very well; indeed, they are in the best position to know it. For this government is so weak and soft that it does not dare make use of even its legal options. With one eye it is always watching what the opposition's response to its own measures will be. But if the cabinet

keeps yielding ground constantly, it should not be surprised that the opposition is growing bolder and will eventually gain the upper hand. And here is the most recent example: Initially the media bill would have required a two-thirds majority for its passage, but now the opposition is demanding 100-percent unanimity. Because the SZDSZ and FIDESZ have been able to win over also the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], and now they are blackmailing the government jointly.

After all it would be ridiculous—truly ridiculous!—if the government were unable to even rid itself of two of its officials. Whereas it knows very well that the two are out to bring it down, since the entire opposition is behind them. Perhaps the government will now be able to drive Hankiss out from Hungarian Television, but only because he allegedly did something that violates financial discipline and is therefore liable to face disciplinary proceedings. But what if he had not committed this "tragic offense"? Then he would probably be laughing up his sleeve, in the knowledge that he can play a state within the state, because he cannot be removed from office. And that is obviously what also Csaba Gombar is thinking.

Well, if the government and the MDF within it are so weak, then—regrettably—they will probably lose the next election. The only trouble is that democracy will be brought down together with this government. For that very reason the MDF, in full awareness of its strength, should imbue itself with the firm conviction that the nation's patriotic, conservative, center-right masses are indeed behind it and are expecting that the old political system's scandalmongers will disappear from every sphere of our life. In other words, that a real change of political systems will finally take place. So that the people will not feel that they "looked around, but could not find their homeland in their native country."

If that fails to happen, the grave danger will arise that the masses, dazed by the mendacious bombastic speeches, might fall into the opposition's arms. And may God then spare the Hungarian nation from yet another leftist revision!

#### **\* Victims of Communist Persecution Demand 'Justice'**

93CH0273B Budapest *MAGYAR FORUM* in  
Hungarian 17 Dec 92 p 3

[Interview with Jenő Fonay, president of the National Alliance of Political Prisoners, by Gabor Mocsonoky; place and date not given: "The Rendering of Justice Is Not Open to Bargaining"]

[Text] *The National Alliance of Political Prisoners (POFOSZ) held its third congress last weekend. Reports on the proceedings appearing in the daily press have been conflicting in their coverage of what transpired there, and of the important statements and resolutions. Also for that reason, we deemed it important to interview the most authentic source of information, Jenő Fonay, the organization's newly reelected president. First of all, we discussed the members of POFOSZ, as distinct from the many similar organizations.*



[Fonay] All those who between 1945 and 1989, until the end of the one-party political system, suffered persecution of any kind, whether imprisonment, deportation, abduction, captivity, or detention in a concentration camp. We have various sections: for 1956 freedom fighters, former prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and the West respectively, former prisoners sentenced before 1956, the ones sentenced after 1963, and for former soldiers who had been assigned to labor service. Therefore I fail to understand the need for 10 or more additional organizations in Hungary that are likewise recruiting former political prisoners. In order to unify the camp of those who support the same ideals, the same will and same objective, POFOSZ is now considering calling back those fellow sufferers who have been won over by the other organizations.

[Mocsonoky] Then there are more camps than just one?

[Fonay] Yes there are. Our members are primarily persons who took up arms and fought for freedom in 1956. The members of the Committee for Historical Justice (TIB) are mostly persons who fought with intellectual tools. One could not even imagine POFOSZ and TIB sharing a common will.

[Mocsonoky] From what does this irreconcilable difference stem?

[Fonay] It became apparent in 1956, when the Petofi Circle was formed. Those who belonged to that circle were thinking of ways to reform socialism. Had there not been then a will that wanted a more radical change, they would still be discussing reforms. The thinking of most of them is based on similar principles even today, and they are still supporters of socialism. I may safely say that, because I was one of the founding members of TIB, and I know very well why I had to leave and form POFOSZ. Because by then we had already reached the point where we were forced to conclude that no further progress could be made by debating or by writing articles and essays. It is necessary to act, specifically by organizing the masses. There are 392,000 former victims of political persecution living in Hungary today. We had to organize POFOSZ for their sake.

[Mocsonoky] There has been a significant change of the leadership within the TIB since then.

[Fonay] There, too, former armed fighters were the ones who wanted these changes. Many of those TIB members are also members of POFOSZ. Those are the members who favor firmer action. They take part in demonstrations—for the dismissal of the presidents of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, or for rendering justice. At the same time, the other side is fairly distinct. Its members want to erect a monument to reconciliation, for instance.

[Mocsonoky] With whom are you able to cooperate?

[Fonay] With the former armed fighters, namely with the national guardsmen. We too have seven groups of national guardsmen. We want to organize those who fought and suffered together with us. We are not distancing ourselves from their contrasting views, but neither are we airing those views in public. Our organization decides everything by consensus. Naturally, we will continue to engage in practical politics. If necessary, we will again act the way we did on 8

December, when we protested against holding the congress of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] at the site, and on the anniversary, of the volley of shots fired into the crowd in Salgotarjan. I have good reason to say that firm action in this country can be expected only of those who dared to take up arms for our freedom in 1956. But since we are dealing with sensible people of sound mind, we also know that it is not always necessary to flex our muscles, because we are also able to negotiate. The rendering of justice, however, is not negotiable!

[Mocsonoky] It was said at your congress that you would take action if no law is enacted on rendering justice.

[Fonay] In this case we will continue what we began in Salgotarjan—namely, to identify the guilty in public. Everywhere and at every opportunity that arises. On such occasions we will also demonstrate that one person—I myself in the given case—is not always able to hold back our masses.

[Mocsonoky] You are proposing a new Electoral Law, among other things.

[Fonay] As we approach the next elections, the resolutions we have adopted might as well serve as a program. Changes are necessary in the Electoral Law, because under the present one the voters are unable to assert their will. Consider the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], for example. Only one of its MP's won his seat through the will of the voters; all the others had been listed candidates. Therefore, voting for lists ought to be abolished. We are also demanding that every district be represented by someone born and bred in it, by a local resident who lives among his constituents and is familiar with their thinking.

It should be noted that the change of political systems has succeeded miraculously in this country and is unprecedented in our history. The party that dominated the field for 45 years received merely 6.5 percent of the vote. Which means that the other side scored a victory close to 93 percent! It is regrettable that this enormous force split the moment the new parliament convened. In other words, we were misled. Since the victims of political persecution were the vanguard fighting for changes in this country, they naturally joined the side that acted with the best intention. For that reason, this camp cast very many votes for the SZDSZ. By now these voters have turned away from the Free Democrats.

[Mocsonoky] And where have they turned?

[Fonay] To the ruling parties. Lately we have received much from the government. With the Interior Ministry's help and Peter Boross's sponsorship, we have established the Freedom Fighters Foundation. There are five ministers on its board of trustees, and we have delegated six victims of political persecution to the board. In a Matyasfold military complex that became empty when the Soviet troops left, we obtained two buildings in which we are able to provide housing for families and for individuals living alone. Acknowledging the terrible poverty, the government is also disbursing aid. Up to now some 400 persons have received 10,000 forints each.

[Mocsonoky] And in exchange, POFOSZ is supporting the government?

[Fonay] That is the wrong approach. Seeing what the government has done for them so far, the members are supporting the ruling parties. In the 1990 elections, 90 percent of the members voted for the ruling parties. We had to notice that the government is helping us because it recognizes the reality. Of course, all sorts of clumsy, malicious and stupid accusations also began to circulate. According to PSZT! MAGAZIN, for instance, I received 70 million forints from Jozsef Antall. I would like to see at least 70 fillers of that amount! I have not received a single filler from either Antall or anyone else. Nor am I asking for anything. I am not even collecting my salary as president of POFOSZ.

[Mocsonoky] What do you expect of the 1994 elections?

[Fonay] Every effort is being made these days to produce indications of a reversion. That is merely a journalistic trick, and nothing more. Because it is in "good" hands, the press is able to prove anything it wants to prove. But I am able to prove something entirely different. If journalists were to accompany me to the provinces for an extracurricular history lesson, they would come face to face with reality. Without allowing even a break, students demand that I tell them stories. Upon witnessing this—and if there is some decency in them, of course—the journalists would probably not write any more articles that raise the specter of reversion. Specifically because of such indications, we are certain that in the 1994 elections—despite predictions that Arpad Goncz or Viktor Orban will be the winner—the outcome will be the exact opposite. At one time we had enlightened also today's "notables"—Demszky, Hodosan, Koszeg, Haraszti, and the others—yet we were the ones to be misled. When they were "ramming," I had not encouraged anyone to do so. Led by Orban, they went too far. Exactly during the reburial, when we were weeping. Since then I have had opportunity to convince myself that their statements had been parts of a maneuver to mislead. No Hungarian will ever believe those words again.

[Mocsonoky] This is your contention despite the fact that there truly are indications of a reversion?

[Fonay] I am certain of a great victory. Of a much greater, truer, and clean victory!

[Mocsonoky] Also within a purged Smallholders Party, for instance?

[Fonay] It saddens me very much when I have to discuss them. After all, about 40 percent of POFOSZ members had been Smallholders previously. As former kulaks, the treatment they were subjected to in prisons was horrible, perhaps even worse than our own. I do not know what to make of what their party is doing at present, or of what is being done to it. I am no longer able to tell who is a real smallholder.

[Mocsonoky] That party was demolished and placed under Communist control also after 1945.

[Fonay] Yes, but that wonderful, pure, Christian crowd—the villagers who at Torgyan's meetings unpack their lunch

on the next chair and begin to eat with their pocket knives—need to hear just one real word and immediately know where their place is. There was *The Day of Wrath*, for instance. We just had to say a word, and a crowd of some 10,000 immediately gathered.

[Mocsonoky] You are demanding a bicameral parliament. Why?

[Fonay] If there were such a parliament in Hungary now, the passed bills would be going to the Upper House rather than to the Constitutional Court. And people with clean records would be sitting in the Upper House. They would have to have clean records!

[Mocsonoky] Who are the people with clean records?

[Fonay] The congress clearly stated that we are not concerned with the former simple party member. If otherwise he had done nothing else, he has no cause to fear that he might be called to account for having been a simple party member. But those who functioned as judges, prosecutors or State Security officers, who pissed into a prisoner's mouth, tore off his nails and committed murder, they must indeed be brought to account. And today such people, or their sons, are sitting in parliament. At one time I assumed that only people with a clean record can get elected to parliament. It is not the pact we should be talking about now, for it was concluded only in the country's interest, to get the Russians out. The trouble is that the persons who participated in concluding the pact were not entirely spotless themselves.

[Mocsonoky] You have again confirmed that both fascism and communism must be condemned equally.

[Fonay] It is an impossible situation that today only fascism may be cited as a deterring example, when 1944—although it came first in chronological order—lasted merely a few months, whereas bolshevism has a 45-year history. I am convinced that the latter has at least twice as many victims. Therefore I will never allow the Hungarian people to be branded as fascists. Let us not talk just about 1944, but also about what happened in 1956. About the 26 volleys of shots and their victims.

[Mocsonoky] How many people actually support the demands of POFOSZ?

[Fonay] There are 1.5 million people who belong to us in some form. Let a reporter of KURIR accompany us, for instance, when we are placing a grave marker, or unveiling a memorial plaque or monument, for some hero of 1956. And let him then report how the "fascists" are organizing. Because the entire village or town is gathered to mourn just one person who became a victim of the revolution. That is why Hungary's present reality can never be divorced from 1956. That year had serious objectives whose realization would mean significant progress even today.

**\* SZDSZ MP on Impact of Media Budget Transfer**

93CH0273A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in  
Hungarian 21 Dec 92 p 10

[Interview with Deputy Karoly Attila Soos, Alliance of Free Democrats chairman of the National Assembly's Budget



Committee, by A. Istvan Varga; place and date not given: "Duna TV's Mysterious 2 Billion Forints; Could Programming Policy Become a Topic of the Weekly Cabinet Meetings?"

[Text] *The media are under tighter budgetary control than at the time of the party-state, claims Karoly Attila Soos, executive director of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and the chairman of the National Assembly's Budget Committee. We interviewed him on the consequences of including in the state budget the allocations for Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television under the heading of the Prime Minister's Office.*

[Varga] As reported in our Friday issue, Gyorgy Szilvasy declared that the transfer and inclusion of the media allocations in the state budget under the heading of the Prime Minister's Office do not curtail the independence of the two institutions, because the Prime Minister's Office has merely the right of ex post budgetary control. Yet the SZDSZ is vehemently objecting to this.

[Soos] In 1992, Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television managed their allocations independently, and only the National Assembly could interfere in their finances. As of 1 January 1993, the cabinet at its weekly meetings will be able to interfere randomly in the lives of the two institutions. It will be able to prevent the production of any program simply by refusing to approve any funds for it. It will be able to freeze the funds of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television one day, and to unfreeze them the next, if suitable programs have been produced. The cabinet will be able to do all this without even the least bit of public oversight.

[Varga] By being under the budgetary control of the government rather than of the Prime Minister's Office, the media are being treated the same way as the National Security Office or the State Property Agency. Is that so bad?

[Soos] Gyorgy Szilvasy said that the Prime Minister's Office does not have authority to exercise budgetary control over the State Property Agency or the security services. That is correct. But the fact is that the government does not have such authority either. By law, the State Property Agency and the security services are entirely independent, and they will remain independent in 1993 as well. In practice, they operate under separate budget headings and administer their budget allocations independently. During the debate on the 1993 budget bill the SZDSZ proposed that, since Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television have been included under the heading of the Prime Minister's Office, they ought to be granted independence similar to what the State Property Agency, for instance, enjoys. But the enacted law states that the government has authority to exercise budgetary control over the media. I wish to emphasize that the government does not have such authority over the National Security Office and the State Property Agency. The government's representatives are doing everything possible to blur that distinction.

[Varga] But somebody, some agency, has to oversee the finances of the media. Such oversight does not necessarily mean that the media have lost their independence.

[Soos] The state budget has about 20 headings. Each heading is independent and is postaudited by the Auditor General's Office. On the basis of a report prepared by that office, or even without one, the National Assembly may withdraw any amount from the allocation for any of the headings. However, the National Assembly's proceedings are open to public scrutiny, and it would be difficult to implement the National Assembly's programming directives without creating an uproar. By granting the government authority to exercise budgetary control, however, its directives will determine what goes on at Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio. The objection, in other words, is not that these provisions are creating some sort of control over these institutions, for there has been control over them in the past as well. The point is that the media have been placed under direct budgetary control, which is much tighter than even at the time of the party-state. In conjunction with financing, the government is able to do things that it cannot do even in its own ministries.

[Varga] What additional authority might the government have as of the beginning of next year?

[Soos] The government has been granted planning authority, authority to modify budget allocations and to approve spending in advance, and authority to request reports and information. It is able to prohibit or allow any disbursement, or the production of any program. It may withdraw funds from an institution without stating the reasons for doing so, and it may reallocate such funds to any of the departments it controls. Thus Tamas Katona, state secretary in the Prime Minister's Office, could be Hungarian Television's censor, and the cabinet could consider programming as often as every week, if it wanted to. All this, of course, seriously violates the Constitution, which specifies that the independence of the media must be ensured through institutional guarantees. But what we have here is exactly the creation of guarantees to ensure subordination to the government. That is why we have turned to the Constitutional Court.

[Varga] Will the president of Hungarian Television, whose appointment requires the signature of the Republic's president, be merely a figurehead from now on?

[Soos] Not at all. There will still be things for him to do. He can receive foreign guests, present decorations, and demonstrate how independent Hungarian Television is.

[Varga] Will the same rules apply to the recently established Duna [Danube] TV as well?

[Soos] Duna TV is operated by the Hungaria Television Foundation, a private institution established by the government. The National Assembly devoted 2.5 months to considering the budget bill, something that even Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa has appreciated. After the budget debate it was announced that the Hungaria Television Foundation would soon begin operation, on a state subsidy of two billion forints. Incidentally, the home of Sandor Csoori serves as the foundation's headquarters. At any rate, there is not one word about those two billions in the enacted budget.

[Varga] Where will the government get those two billion forints?

[Soos] The government could transfer this amount to the foundation from the appropriations for Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio. After all, the government can do whatever it likes.

[Varga] What is the difference between operating respectively as a foundation and as a budgetary organization?

[Soos] The National Assembly's Cultural Committee has been debating for the past two years how the financing of Hungarian Television's operations ought to be organized. On the insistence of the ruling parties, ever more restrictions have been included in the legislative bill. But in the deed establishing the Hungaria Television Foundation there is merely one sentence, just a line and a half long, which states: "The Hungaria Television Foundation may engage in business activity." And perhaps the provision that Sandor Csoori and Gyula Kodolanyi are authorized to make withdrawals from the foundation's bank account also ties in with that sentence. There is nothing about who is responsible for the foundation's financial management and who is to control it. For 5,000 forints they [Csoori and Kodolanyi] could easily set up a limited partnership and safely transfer the 2 billion forints to it. The establishment of the Hungaria Television Foundation is likewise entirely unconstitutional, because guarantees are lacking to ensure its independence of the government.

[Varga] Why is the government employing a double standard?

[Soos] Why should the government exercise strict control over the finances of the Hungaria Television Foundation when it is staffing the foundation with people whom it considers reliable? But it wants to exercise strict budgetary control over Hungarian Television, whose managers were selected with the consensus of the six political parties.

**\* Financing of Church Activities Discussed**  
*93CH0283B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian*  
*23 Dec 92 p 41*

["Church Financing: Separation in Three Phases... From Basic Church Functions, Through Partial Compensation, to Social Commitment"]

[Text] This year too, the issue of church financing for next year elicited a small storm during the budget debate and subsequently in the press. It is thus becoming more and more pressing to work out a permanent model for financing, which is built on automatic mechanisms, eliminates bargaining, and creates a fundamental condition for the desirable separation of state and church.

Preparations have begun with the participation of representatives of the Ministry of Culture and Education, the Ministry of Justice, and the Office of the Council of Ministers. The objective is to omit the category that includes the two

largest items (grants for the restoration, investment, and development of basic church institutions) by the time the 1994 budget is prepared.

There is no final version yet; there are only coordinated concepts. The concept of Ivan Plattthy, head of the Main Department of Church Relations of the Ministry of Culture and Education, calls for financing in several phases. Phase one would make the uninterrupted operation of the churches possible. This would end the churches' dependency in matters of ministerial services and basic church functions.

This could also be achieved in practice through a modification of the tax law, namely, every taxpayer could specify which church or denomination he wants to pay a certain percentage of his income tax to, or may specify a certain social purpose for which he wants to pay instead. In Italy, such a system was introduced two years ago, and it seems to work. Most parties and churches also seem to favor such a concept. It is a question of what percentage of personal income taxes would make it possible for the churches to operate independently of the state. In view of the fact that there was a 40-year hiatus in the operation of Hungarian churches and that the physical conditions of their institutions and buildings are extremely run-down, this percentage could conceivably be somewhat higher in the first years, and later, after conditions have improved, may be lowered to a permanent level.

Of course, this alternative also elicits some concerns. Because of the high level of unemployment and the large number of pensioners, there is much uncertainty about the amount of revenues coming from personal income taxes. The question arises whether requiring a citizen to take such an open stand in his tax return would be a violation of human rights. The idea of a voucher system was raised to deal with the latter.

But there is another concept which calls for state grants for the churches on the basis of the size of their memberships. (See Bishop Endre Gyulay's views in another article of FIGYELO.) But who shall issue and collect this information? The law on freedom of conscience and freedom of religion forbids any denominational membership registry.

The two alternatives can be combined. Indeed, in the case of small churches—e.g., in the case of the historical Eastern Orthodox Church—they must be combined. Obviously, they would get little from personal income taxes, for the number of its members who are below 40 has dwindled, and the rest have grown old. Therefore, it needs some additional guarantees; indeed, speedy measures should be taken in this case.

After the matter of financing their basic functions has been dealt with, phase two must provide a compliance with the law (Statute 1991.XXXII, Article 15), namely, that partial compensation is due to 13 historical churches if they relinquish their former real estate property or if they do not want to carry out any legally specified functions. Here an agreement between state and church is needed as to the amount and schedule of compensation. Should the church receive a

onetime compensation or one to be payable in several installments, or perhaps perpetual interest on property that is used by the state (Austria has some examples of the latter)?

Phase three would be the clarification of the financing of social commitments. This phase is also number three time-wise and would be essentially structured according to citizen demand.

With regard to the return of church real estate property, about 8 percent of the more than 6,000 claims have been settled this year—which is in excess of the 5 percent specified by the law—in part as a result of agreements between the church and local governments and in part as a result of dealing with debated cases of compensation on a government level. On the local level, 400 cases have been settled and 159 have been forwarded to reconciliation committees with claims totaling 3.5 billion forints. In the end, 121 of these cases were settled through negotiations between the churches and the government with claims totaling 1.44 billion forints, 1.1 billion of which will be paid from this year's budget, and the remainder will be paid next year. (Most compensation went to local governments, with the purpose of finding places for those institutions and functions that were located in returned church real estate property.)

Since 195 cases will be handled at the top level in 1993 with claims totaling 6.5 billion forints, parliament—in view of this year's experiences—approved 3 billion forints for compensation.

According to the law, churches can reclaim real estate property only for carrying out their functions, i.e., for being able to operate, for education, or for social, health, and similar purposes. In all of these areas, they will receive all the state benefits that local governments were given earlier. With regard to the coverage of additional expenses, the churches were able to come to agreement with most local governments—based on the principle that the churches have actually assumed local-government commitments which would have been financed earlier with local government funds. The clarification of their right to this coverage, which is questioned by many and which is not recognized by several local governments, would actually take place during phase three of the financing package.

In the meantime, parliament has decided on a few contradictory cases that have surfaced, e.g., the concern that church schools may not get any part of the block grants and grants-in-aid that local governments receive, even though they might want only to build a gymnasium just like a public school might. For this and similar purposes (restoration, investment), parliament allocated for the churches 400 million forints from the fund for block grants and grants-in-aid. Another achievement is that the state will pay for the solidarity funds of church schools, just as it pays for the funds of local governments. On the other hand, the public employee status of educators teaching in church schools must still be clarified, meaning that it will be necessary to modify the public employee law.

#### A Few Main Items Taken From the Budget Proposal's Heading, Church Grants<sup>1</sup>

Grants for basic church functions	980
Restoration, investment, and development of basic church institutions	870
Reconstruction of Pannonhalma	100
Reconstruction of the Dob Street Synagogue	200
Ministerial activities	400

<sup>1</sup>Unannounced data, based on the modifications known to us, in million forints.

#### Church Real Estate Property and Compensation

(In Millions of Forints)

<b>1992</b>	
To churches	203
To institutions and companies	394
To local governments	843
Total	1,440 <sup>1</sup>
1992 payments	1,100
<b>1993</b>	
Annual budget	3,000
Payments carried over from 1992 at the expense of the annual budget	340

<sup>1</sup>Compensation to be paid for 121 former church real estate properties, in accordance with a 1992 resolution of the Council of Ministers.

Note: Originally, claims for compensation in 1992 totaled 3.5 billion forints for 159 real estate properties. For 1993, it is 6.5 billion forints for 195 real estate properties.

#### \* Industrial Production Statistics Reported

93CH0283A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 23 Dec 92 p 35

[Central Statistical Office report: "Production Mirror"]

[Text] Within the main industrial branches, production in the individual industries has been rather varied: The production index of the 62 special industrial areas fell between 44 and 144.7 between January and October.

Production increased in six industries (crude oil and natural gas, oil refining, sawboard, vegetable oil, beer, and soft drink industries).

Production decreased by less than 10 percent in seven industries (glass, plastics and synthetics, paper, textile and clothing, milk, milling, and sugar industries).

Production decreased by 10-20 percent in 15 industries (electric power, brick, stone, gravel, construction insulation material, fine ceramics, organic and inorganic processing, plastic processing, other wood processing, printing, poultry processing, baking, cake, candy, alcohol, wine, and tobacco industries).

Production decreased by 20-30 percent in 23 industries (coal, bauxite, other ore mining, aluminum, other nonferrous metal, machine manufacture, electric machine, telecommunication, metal mass product, lime, cement, concrete element manufacturing, rubber, pharmaceutical, household and cosmetics, furniture, cotton, flax, mercer, leather, fur, shoe, other, meat, and preservative industries).

Production decreased by 30-40 percent in nine industries (metallurgy, vehicle, asbestos cement, gas, artificial fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide, carpentry, wool, knitting, hand crafts, and cottage industries).

Production decreased by more than 50 percent in two industries (instrument and silk industries).

**\* Suchocka's 'Resoluteness, Objectivity' Noted**  
 93EP0151A Warsaw WPROST in Polish No 51/52,  
 20-27 Dec 92 pp 50-51

[Article by Agnieszka Sowa and Piotr Andrzejewski: "The School of Makeup: Tadeusz Mazowiecki Benefited From the Image of a Worried Father of the Fatherland; Jan Krzysztof Bielecki Won Sympathy by His Shyness; Hanna Suchocka's Resoluteness and Objectivity 'Sell' Best"]

[Text] "I had more freedom as a pupil at the convent school than I have now that I am prime minister," said Hanna Suchocka. She is joking, but her smile is rueful. Little has remained of her old private life. What she regrets most is trips abroad. Some people think that now she would travel aplenty. But a prime minister's travels mean looking at the world from a window while traveling at breakneck speed. Quite often, organizers forget that they are dealing with a woman and fail to provide time in her crowded schedule for her to change clothing or repair makeup. Before she became prime minister, she often traveled abroad as chairperson of the Polish delegation to the European Parliament.

"I had been able to stroll freely through the city, to go with friends for a beer."

The move from Poznan to the official residence in the government compound was tolerated by the dog Zulik much better than by his mistress. "This is much more spacious than my Poznan home," said Prime Minister Suchocka. But she could not refrain from a critical comment—namely, that, while the house looks large from the outside, the inside is not rationally designed. "I do not feel at home here. I am not changing the furniture or hanging up the pictures I received." In the spacious hallway, there is always an officer on duty, and the kitchen, where, other than tea, only meals for the dog are prepared because Ms. Prime Minister most often eats breakfast at the URM (Office of the Council of Ministers)—is ruled by the two housekeepers.

The alarm clock rings at 0730. After 0800, Secret Service escorts appear. Departure for the URM, or sometimes the Sejm. A regular item on the agenda is the morning "staff meeting" at 1000, at which the prime minister meets with Minister Tadeusz Syryjczyk, URM Director Jan Rokita, the prime minister's chief of staff, Bogdan Trepinski, Minister Jerzy Kozminski, and Press Secretary Zdobyslaw Milewski. The remaining agenda is filled by meetings and conferences. Most often, the prime minister dines at the URM's "VIP" canteen in the company of Minister Syryjczyk, who thus benefits by having an assured extra dessert.

Sometimes, when it is a "working" dinner, Ms. Prime Minister invites a guest to her office. (The canteen is cramped, with four tables standing close to each other, and so it is difficult to speak without being overheard by everyone.) The last item on the official agenda is usually at

about 2000, although sometimes much later. Hanna Suchocka likes to go to the opera. "Music enables me to relax. Reading requires more concentration. Besides, I feel guilty reaching for a book when papers pile up on my desk." There is not enough time to read everything at the URM, and so "household chores" usually do not end before 0200.

"Buying glad rags at leisure" is over. At the same time, Ms. Prime Minister refused to let a "staff of experts" decide on what she should wear. Her wardrobe had to be complemented. "Television cameras will reveal even a thread hanging awry, so I had to put aside most of my dresses and tailor-made suits." Most often, her sister helps her with shopping. "We have the same figure, and she knows my preferences. I trust most the clothes from Modena."

Sometimes while driven by a government limousine on Nowy Swiat, the head of government orders the chauffeur to stop, and she and her sister enter a store. While Secret Service agents scrutinize the interior, Ms. Prime Minister buys pantyhose.

She has no time to hesitate; a decision must be made quickly. "It is not easy for a woman, especially in the company of three men," said Prime Minister Suchocka. She admitted that the constant presence of others bothers her most. "I am being watched constantly, and I feel it."

It is a toss-up who attaches greater importance to the looks of Ms. Prime Minister—she herself or the team of consultants appointed chiefly to investigate the public's response to the government, but which also evaluates the prime minister's television "image." The team—Bozena Walter; Nina Dziemidowicz; Krzysztof Nowak, a sociologist from Leszek Balcerowicz's Foundation for Economic Education; Marek Podhorecki, a former adviser to Ronald Reagan's electoral campaign; and Zdobyslaw Milewski—meets once every two weeks. They decide on the television programs in which Ms. Prime Minister should appear. The interview for the "Male Wiadomosci [Trivial News]" newscast was readily approved, but the prime minister's appearance on Wieslaw Walendziak's "Without Tempering" was grudgingly approved: A dozen or so photographs were examined thoroughly, before their publication was approved. Three were selected, but the final decision was made by Ms. Prime Minister herself.

The experts advised the head of government to change her hairdo and get rid of the eyeglass chain.

Still, unlike the U.S. custom, no one is devising for the head of government such things as anecdotes and witticisms.

Some politicians are trying to propagate the opinion that Poland's first female chairperson of the Council of Minister is a figurehead, accomplishing little of substance, while the important decisions are made by the head of the Program Office, Minister Tadeusz Syryjczyk, and the director of the URM, Minister Jan Rokita. Sure, Hanna Suchocka did not

used to be a well-known politician in Poland, and she did not take part in the talks leading to the formation of the coalition government, and neither is she an expert on the economy—all this plus the fact that she is a woman may give the impression that she does not make decisions on important national issues.

The team of advisers and the extremely "strong" experts and analysts for the government compensate for the absence of "another Balcerowicz" [economic czar] in the government.

Sociological studies indicate that Suchocka's public image is positive. As letters also show, what "sells" best is her expertise, decisiveness, common sense, and objectivity. Perhaps something that "tugs at the heart strings" is missing. Experts offer the reminder that Mazowiecki had long profited from his image as a martyr, agonizing over the difficult situation of the country, as the father of the country, so to speak, while Bielecki's shyness, stuttering, and apologetic manner appealed to the public. That is why they are advising Ms. Prime Minister to show "more warmth."

**Marko Views RMDSZ Factions, Prospects***93CH0314A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 9-10 Jan 93 pp 1, 5*

[Interview with Senator Bela Marko shortly before his election as president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Barna Marosi in Tirgu Mures: "On Our Way to a New, Rational Unity"]

[Text] *In less than a week the third congress of the RMDSZ [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] will open in Brasso [Brasov]. The usual expectation of a miracle precedes the congress. Competing groups expect to be victorious, justifying the swashbuckling that has been going on. The sober force—presumably a majority within the minority—expects a rearrangement, and pins its hopes to developing leadership for the Union and to establishing an opportunity to make progress. One also hears about hysterical groups that have nothing to lose by now, but are always prepared to courageously disintegrate the Union itself.*

*We conversed with poet Bela Marko, LATO's editor in chief, in the drawing room of his Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], Gecse Daniel Street apartment—as that street had been called before. He also serves as an RMDSZ senator.*

[Marosi] Many people—both liberals and extremist radicals—claim that the RMDSZ is an aged, obsolete political formation. Could it really be true that Hungarians in Romania no longer need this political union, this grand coalition?

[Marko] Well yes, one hears such statements every day. These attacks originate from two directions. Many people holding Romanian political positions, and even members of the Romanian opposition, assert that organizations like the RMDSZ prevent the Hungarian population of Romania from becoming pluralized and integrated with Romanian public life. From their standpoint it would be more acceptable if the Hungarian community joined Romanian political parties pursuant to each individual's outlook on the world. Suffice it to say that this alternative cannot be followed by us today or tomorrow, it cannot be regarded as an alternative. This would draw the most fatal consequence: full assimilation! It is impossible for us to accept the kind of integration demanded by Romanian policies, because our activities are based on a different concept than that of any Romanian party, including the nationalities program of the opposition.

Even more people attack the RMDSZ from the inside, claiming that an organization that follows unified policies does not enable the free expression of various views and ideologies. This is what they have to say: Is there a need for the RMDSZ, or, to be more exact, do Hungarians in Transylvania need the RMDSZ? This kind of critique—often fully justifiable attacks—does not question the validity of the Union's existence.

[Marosi] This leads us to the question of whether there is a need for unity. So much energy has been consumed for years in defense of Hungarian unity, and so much energy has been expended to challenge the idea of this unity, that I want to ask you at last: Is there a need for that crucial unity?

[Marko] I believe that we must have a common intent to perceive, to establish an organization in which concepts, various views of the world, and differences of opinion prevail absolutely freely. The appropriate framework for such an organization has not yet evolved. Various views should not clash somewhere in the background, on backstage, in an informal manner; personal interests should not clash; we should not be witnessing repeated obscure battles. We view the Hungarians of Romania as an entity, as a united whole within Romanian society. If that is the case, this entity needs a vehicle to express itself in politics, in the various spheres of politics, and in all aspects of life. This is the function of our political union, the RMDSZ. This is the goal; this is how the union must be organized, reorganized, and made operational. Many respond to this kind of thinking by saying that the RMDSZ was brought to life by necessity, and that the RMDSZ would cease to function the moment the social and minority problems were resolved. That is NOT at all my view because we will also continue to be a Hungarian community in the more distant future; this peculiar community will always have its own peculiar interests; and, by nature, the life of this community will always have a sphere, a region, in which it wants to make independent, autonomous decisions based on its own autonomous governing system. All this increasingly requires an appropriately established and developed, fine-tuned, well-greased political union or grand coalition. This is why I feel a hundred times more certain about the need to bring to perfection such a well-functioning, dynamic unit, as well as rational cooperation and joint action hereafter, in the future!

[Marosi] Is it possible, is it permissible to draw some kind of parallel between the situation of Hungarians in Transylvania on the one hand and Hungarians in Serbia, in the Bacska [Backa, Yugoslavia] region, and in the Highlands, in Slovakia, on the other? Or, does the difference manifest itself only in the fact that, for instance, the social structure of Hungarians in the Highlands is more diverse, and therefore the political life of those Hungarians is also more diverse?

[Marko] The extent to which the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia, in the lower Carpathians, in Serbia, and in the Vojvodina is analogous with ours is indeed interesting. Situations repeat themselves, there are only time phase differences, but the situation, the reactions, the oppressive measures initiated by the majority, the response by the minority, hauntingly repeat themselves. It is in our best interest to establish the closest possible relationship with the rest of the Hungarian communities, because we could draw quite a few conclusions and articulate these things much better by acting jointly. This, of course, is not meant to deny the fact that situations, disputes, and historical antecedents specific to the given regions exist everywhere; in the end, however, the solutions must be very similar and must closely resemble the solutions found by others.... I think it would be a waste of time to analyze matters from the standpoint of the extent to which the more developed civil society of the Highlands caused the evolution of a more pluralistic political life there, the fact that several parties exist there within the Hungarian community. I am not

certain whether civil society there is more developed, and whether it contains several tiers. Establishing several parties in Transylvania would have been conceivable after Christmas 1989, in January 1990. I would remind you that at the outset, there immediately appeared an Independent Hungarian Party, but I have good reason to believe that this was not a spontaneous organizing effort; it did not come about at the initiative of a few people, but was based on the will of higher powers in order to divide the Hungarians. But later on some entirely different political parties were formed, real parties like the Christian Democrats and the Smallholders, supported then and now by a certain stratum of the intelligentsia, by the masses. Finally, we still have parties outside of the RMDSZ. I think that we were fortunate to be able to unite these initiatives so that no conflict evolved among them; everyone accepted the coalition in the framework of the RMDSZ, and everyone accepted the RMDSZ as having priority in politics. Regarding the situation in Slovakia, one should recognize the number of problems created in the past and the present by the fact that the Hungarians of the Highlands were unable to form a coalition for the elections, and were unable to represent the full spectrum of political life. The two paths, the two possibilities can be well assessed by comparing the examples provided in the Highlands and in Transylvania. Our solution is better and more fortunate, by all means, in my view.

[Marosi] What outcome do you expect from the Brasso congress? Could the RMDSZ be torn apart?

[Marko] Aware of the real forces, there is a very firm and very strong will to preserve a solid, united union. Responsible people will not enable, will not allow any kind of

schism. All tasks might not be performed due to the shortness of time, the crowded program, and under the pressure of the agenda—a new set of bylaws, a new program must be approved, and officers must be elected. All this cannot be resolved in such short period of time. We will find a bridge, however, to settle certain issues later. And aside from all this, the congress should not be viewed as a certain watershed event, as a milestone where everything left undecided, left unresolved so far, would be settled. It would be impossible to do so. I am looking forward to the congress with minimum expectations, but I believe that this is also the most we can expect under the circumstances. It is the function of the Brasso congress to establish conditions—primarily personal conditions—for further work. A good basic program, good leadership, and a good, modern structure are needed. But the congress cannot make final decisions regarding any important issue; we are not going to be able to find absolute solutions at this time. For example, finding final solutions to every specific detail of the autonomy issue is inconceivable. We must develop a union structure capable of operating functionally and continuously. For this reason the delegates from Maros [Mures] County recommend that the congress authorize the new leadership, the new leadership body, the successor to the KOT [expansion unknown], to continue this work, to make further changes in the bylaws and in the program. Many things turn out to be nonviable with the passage of time. Based on minimum expectations, we count on the congress to change the leadership, the style, and technique of leadership. This is why I say that the personnel decisions of the congress are not side issues. The kind of leadership that is going to head the RMDSZ is the decisive issue.



**Macedonian Prime Minister Interviewed**

93BA0420A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 17 Dec 92 pp 12-13, 35

[Interview with Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski by Vasil Mickovski; place and date not given: "The Government Is Not Working According to a Scenario"]

[Text] *There were predictions concerning how stable this government would be and whether it would succeed in surviving when the more serious questions, concerning which the parties have different positions, are handled. This is a risk which was known to us and I believe to the others who joined in putting together this government. However, I think that in the majority of the temptations we had to deal with, the government succeeded in overcoming without greater shocks and breaks.*

[PULS] During these 100 days in which otherwise it was expected that the coalition would be subject to serious temptations and even that the political marriage of interests would disintegrate upon the passage of the laws which encroach upon the interests of the nationalities, do you think that the government is stable, or more precisely, is stabilizing?

[Crvenkovski] This is the first multiparty government in Macedonia, and first experiences are costly, not only for the people who are in the government and for the parties who stand behind it, but also in general for all political entities. In accordance with the circumstances that prevail in Macedonia, and bearing in mind the relation of the forces, it is possible to expect that for a long period of time in the future most often we will be dealing with coalitions, that is, with multiparty governments. I do not believe that soon we will have a clear situation in which one party will achieve a convincing victory and will be in a position to form its own government itself. There were predictions concerning how stable this government would be and whether it would succeed in surviving when the more serious questions, concerning which the parties have different positions, are handled. This is a risk that was known to us and I believe to the others who joined in putting together this government. However, I think that in the majority of the temptations with which we had to deal the government succeeded in overcoming without greater shocks and breaks. Simply, even in the situation where someone is in a position to put together a government only of his own ministers, that means of ministers who belong only to one party, that would entail different ideas and positions, let alone when it is a matter of a government composed of representatives of several political parties. Thus, on individual matters, there are different positions and viewpoints in the government. The question is how much these differences come from the different party affiliations and how much from the thinking and viewpoints of the individual people. In any case, it was a period in which we had to deal with great and serious problems, and the government succeeded in overcoming these problems without greater shocks. I hope that this will remain in the future.

[PULS] Do you think that this new quality which comes from the existence of a coalition government has been achieved, or at least is being built?

[Crvenkovski] What I think about this quality is the fact that a different relation between the political parties and between the people is being built. A relation of consultation, a relation of exchange of ideas, readiness to discuss controversial matters, which earlier, until there was such a government, did not exist. This is a guarantee that if we continue along this path it is possible to find a formula for overcoming controversial matters. It is true that there is the risk that there always will be opposition and not always and not on everything will agreement be achieved. However, this occurs even in stable societies. We can never be free of this risk, let alone now when we have so many serious issues to solve. In the meantime this risk, which often is a handicap in the functioning of a multiparty government, on the one hand is an advantage to the government at this moment. Because of the problems with which the government is dealing, the fact is that ideas often have to clash in order for acceptable decisions to be reached, and this is a quality of this government, since it is a way in which this interparty, internationality tolerance is built.

[PULS] Actually, won't the real 100 days begin if we are recognized internationally? It seems that then the excuse that your hands are tied for more serious projects will be gone.

[Crvenkovski] It was very clear to me that this government will not get the customary 100 days for working in peace. This rule was not respected either by the opposition or by the media, which is perhaps normal when you consider the conditions under which this government was elected and the development of events which took place in these three months.

Let me remind you that just during the days when the Assembly was debating the election of the new government, this Republic was subjected to the greatest wave of strikes in its history, in almost all cities and in almost all areas of the economy. Everyday, hundreds, thousands of people expressed their revolt in the factory circles, in the streets, before the Assembly and the government. This was the period when it became definitely clear that the blockade of the southern border would not be a short-term one and that alternative routes would have to be found, first of all for oil delivery. Hundreds and hundreds of automobiles waited for days in front of the gasoline pumps. The sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro were in force, and later were made more harsh. We had a period of almost a month of troublesome import-export conditions with the member countries of the European Community because of that famous admonition and because of the blackmail concerning the use of the name and the seal. The whole crisis was in full swing, the majority of the businesses were operating at minimum capacity, and a good part of them had completely ceased work. The protests on the part of those with money savings became more frequent. The anti-inflation program passed in April had broken down definitively. We were on the verge of a hyperinflation that would be beyond any control. The component of external financial support incredibly was

built into all macroeconomic projections one after another over the years, and it was thoroughly clear that, in spite of all efforts, without more extensive international recognition, the access to the international financial institutions is closed. This government from the very first day of its operation has existed in such a hellish atmosphere. We had to work on two tracks in parallel. On the one hand we will prepare and propose draft laws to the Assembly in order to continue with the completion of the economic and the political system, and on the other hand, very pragmatically, we have to approach them more operationally and to solve all these problems which have been thrust upon us from day to day. First, we needed to reexamine all draft laws that were in the Assembly process already. This was necessary in order for us to determine which of them the government would support and which we would rework. Likewise we began to produce new laws dealing with the political and economic system. At this moment around 140 laws and other acts proposed by the government are in the Assembly. I believe that you will agree that these are significant numbers. On the other hand, in this current pragmatic plan we gave priority to certain matters: First of all we had to eliminate the danger of hyperinflation, which would be beyond any control and could definitely destroy the economy. This task could not wait, and after only one month we prepared additional measures of the stabilization policy, which were of a temporary nature until the end of the year. In addition, we calculated that we are faced with a period of buyback in agriculture, which until now always was partially credited with the primary emission so that we would put up with programmed inflation, and I can say that according to the information of the Institute for Statistics we are moving under the predetermined limits. I have to say that in many things the government had to behave extremely efficiently, to function as a crisis staff. For example, readying the eastern corridor through the Republic of Bulgaria for transportation of petroleum derivatives, which by no means will be able to satisfy our needs, however it makes it possible for life to go on in the Republic.

[PULS] The peaceful summer continued into a hot autumn with respect to how the social tension was heated up. Every change meets resistance. What was the position of the government? Were you an observer or a participant in this process?

[Crvenkovski] We were not passive observers because we did not want this position, nor as an executive power were we able to permit it. There is resistance to the reforms begun or predicted and this is evident. The question now arises: What are the sources of this resistance? If we leave aside the psychological factor of the fear of the new, which always is present when radical changes are imminent and which may be accepted as normal, the dilemma looms when there is still a danger of changes. Who are those who are responsible for the current undefined or semidefined conditions?

First of all it may be said that along with all of the changes made up to now, certain teams continue to function and provide for a secure status and certainty. In part these result from the legally uncertain position of certain subjects, in part from personal relations created years ago. It would be a

mistaken approach if we tried to locate them all in one place, for example in the administration, in the economy, or in policy. They are everywhere—some places more, some places less. The second danger in the reforms results from the populism that is being manifested more and more frequently in different forms and for different reasons. This is a time of highly pronounced tensions, of charged relations between nationalities, of a feeling of individual and collective threats. In other words, this is an ideal time for a birth of a new communism, perhaps not under this name, but with the same messages, for example: "We are all equal, and if this is so then we must all have equal pay," or, the desire of the labor unions to participate in directing the business policy, which in other words would mean reaffirmation of self-management, and so forth.

A good example is the Law for Transformation of the Public Enterprises, which for a year already has not been able to be passed in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. In spite of the widely declared determination of all political parties, as well as the much broader consensus reached concerning the fact that privatization is an inevitability which has to be started as soon as possible and that every day late has its price, recently resistance is becoming increasingly stronger. Suddenly, demagogues, who have begun to complain about the uncertain fate of the working class, have begun to appear, they are talking about work and sweat, about the dangers of exploitation on the part of the future owners, which still do not exist. These usually are those who always wanted to define themselves as anticommunists, but in the current situation behave typically communistically.

[PULS] How does the party spirit of the members of the government inhibit its work, and as prime minister are you satisfied with the loyalty of the ministers?

[Crvenkovski] They are members of a government, and members of certain political parties. This is the reason for their double responsibility for their work to the prime minister and the government as a whole, and on the other hand, responsibility to the parties which proposed them as candidates for office and to their political programs. Meanwhile, if the delegate principle is applied to participation in the work of the government and the party base is consulted about every matter, then the government will have its hands tied and will find itself in an impasse which it is not able to resolve. The government is a body which has to react promptly and daily. It has to work efficiently as a team. Therefore, during the first session I said to the ministers that they are primarily members of the government, and only after that members or candidates of political parties. And I requested of them that they behave in this way. Otherwise they lose as individuals and the parties which they represent lose. These parties which have stood behind the government are connected with it in some way. If the government is unsuccessful, the rating of these parties drops, and vice versa. We have to get used to this. Possibly in the future this will be why political parties will not consider the loyalty of their members to be the first criterion for political office; rather, the first criterion will be quality. If the parties have loyal members in the executive branch and it does not

function, again they lose their reputation among the public. It is normal for people in the government to have different positions with respect to individual matters. This would be the case even if all were from one party. This is good because it means that the people are not being controlled. The responsibility of the president of the government is the greatest since he harmonizes this work between the representatives of different parties and members of the government and will encourage teamwork. Basically, it is the members of the government that have the feeling of adherence to principles. If they sense that some matters are being conducted on somewhat different principles, then loyalty towards the government declines. It is an illusion if we expect that the political parties which are in the government will agree about everything. Every coalition or multiparty government finds the compromise to be a mode of operation. However, it is not compromise which will eliminate the chance for efficient operation of the government.

[PULS] There is public speculation about some "coalition formulas" in which there is no room for the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party]. Do you believe that another political coalition is possible without preliminary elections?

[Crvenkovski] Mathematically it is possible. Legally and formally, likewise. It is a question of political judgement if it is still possible to get along in this way or if it would mean new elections. However, what is interesting is the fact that we are a government of rumors, of versions and subversions, and corridor scenarios. The most commonly used word in the Assembly is scenario. There is constant talk about certain scenarios from outside, from this or that party. If a man becomes so paranoid as to believe in everything that he hears about himself, so that he checks out and performs his actions in accordance with certain people or parties, this will lead to a catastrophic situation. He will not be able to make a single relevant political judgment. He will begin to doubt everything around himself and nothing will function. I am afraid that some even have entered such a paranoid situation and are making nervous moves for these reasons. For those who have entered such a state it is a question of political judgment as to what a retreat from political programs means, and to what degree does this mean a retreat from their political principles and programs. The second thing is, if this is really the case, what would be the position of the public, and how much is it prudent to make such combinations. Thus, now we can only speculate and carry out hypothetical discussions. As a party during this period we are trying to be extremely rational—we are not making nervous moves, we do not want to do anything which has not been thought out. Some even say that we are defensive. However, I think that as a healthy political party we not permitted to react to idle discussions. This would mean a loss of identity. Therefore, it is necessary to have a healthy political evaluation and correct strategy according to which we need to act. We must not lose our compass so that we do not know where we are going. This will be painful, and many moves of the government will be unpopular. We are dealing

with many problems, and this government has a responsibility to bring the entire country through all of these temptations.

[PULS] The remarks made in the parliament that this government, like the preceding one, is not fighting very hard for its jurisdictions, will be an issue for a long time. How do you comment about these attacks and is there decisiveness to be more independent with respect to the other holders of power?

[Crvenkovski] One of the questions that will exist for a long time is the delimitation between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which is one of the basic principles of parliamentary democracy and of legal government. There is still a tendency for the parliament to treat the government as an executive council, to cause interference which directly affects the executive authority. Duties are assigned which are understood in and of themselves and which come from the constitutional position of the government. For example, the following decisions have been made: "The government is obligated to monitor the implementation of a certain law"; information is sought concerning everything, in particular of the type "Who do you empower to meet with Panic?" or "Give us the transcripts so that we can see what you have discussed," and so forth. The government has a clearly defined position with the Constitution, and we are trying to act within the framework of these authorizations.

[PULS] What about autonomy with respect to the president of the Republic?

[Crvenkovski] According to the Constitution, we have a division of the executive power between the president of the Republic and the government. The president has authority, first of all, in foreign policy and in defense. I can say that we have had good cooperation with the president during this period; we have prompt intercommunication, which is necessary for coordination of the activities of the executive authority. Otherwise, the government acts autonomously as part of the operations, which is understandable when we bear in mind the fact that this government is a political multiparty government.

[PULS] There is considerable public speculation that certain ministers are connected with certain companies or are using their government offices for private purposes. What is your comment on this?

[Crvenkovski] At the first meeting of the ministers I told them: "Probably, you could not have chosen a worse time to become ministers. The situation is such that this government will have to take unpopular measures. We will be subjected to criticism constantly both for those things for which we are at fault and for those for which we are not at all at fault. It is important that we know for ourselves and for our own consciences that we have done everything that was within the scope of our abilities, that we have given everything of ourselves. And it is most important that we behave honestly." That which I, as prime minister, will not permit in any case is that someone misuse their office for private purposes. When such things appear I will exercise my right and will call for reconstruction of the government at once. Nevertheless, such was the agreement with the

parties in putting together the government. I had the occasion to read in the press information concerning some members of the government, in fact, written in the form of rumors. I checked them out at once and they proved to be absolutely untrue.

[PULS] Does the question if this coalition is indebted to a certain signature or a certain agreement given in order to set up special statuses in Macedonia remain hanging?

[Crvenkovski] It does not remain hanging. Simply, there is no such thing, neither on the basis of the Hague conferences nor on the basis of some previous agreements for such scenarios. In this situation of the formation of the government, we as a party proceeded from a position that we would create as broad a coalition as possible, prepared to admit even the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] into it. However, they did not agree, as opposed to the others.

[PULS] In accordance with the Edinburgh declaration, what will be the next move of the Macedonian Government and when may we expect "relaxation" with respect to the question of the recognition of Macedonia?

[Crvenkovski] Even before Edinburgh it was very clear that we have two cards that we may play by the end of the year. One was the European Community, and the second is candidacy for the United Nations, in the case of which we may say that these are two separate matters, but, we must be conscious that the one has influence on the other. It is quite clear that Edinburgh and that which is concluded at the summit will have great influence on how the matter is decided in the United Nations, because there are two permanent members and two temporary members from the European Community on the Security Council. It was quite clear that we have two possibilities, but this first one in Edinburgh is as important as that one in the United Nations. Personally, with a majority of others I did not expect that the problem of acceptance will be solved in Edinburgh. However, it was important for us not to take a position which would close the doors to the United Nations for us. This would mean a reaffirmation of the Lisbon Declaration and a commitment of the members of the European Community to represent this declaration in other international institutions. That would close the doors for us for rapid recognition. We obtained economic assistance which is welcome, although it was not the primary goal which we were seeking. Second, it is important that a rigid position was not taken in Edinburgh. Hence, it is necessary that we act very quickly, that is, that we activate the candidacy to the United Nations. If the members of the European Community in the Security Council behave independently, and bearing in mind certain predictions of how the others would behave, then our candidacy in the world organization would be activated for the end of the year. Because, if we pass through the Security Council it will be much easier in the General Assembly, although Greece will make problems both in the Security Council and anywhere it can. Actually, in this way this would be much broader recognition of Macedonia than we obtained in Edinburgh.

This means that now it is necessary to activate the candidacy for acceptance to the United Nations during the next several days. However, there were many remarks made during the course of the last session of the parliament as to why this has not been done up to now. I have to say that acceptance in the United Nations is not like membership in a chess club—if I do not enroll today, then I will do it tomorrow, perhaps then they will accept me. Simply, it was necessary that we have understandings or that we be to some degree sure (we cannot predict 100 percent in any case) that our candidacy will not fail. Because it would be a catastrophic mistake if we activate the candidacy and they reject us there and again return us to the European Community.

[PULS] Do you think that the declaration from Edinburgh is a kind of "liberation" of Macedonia from the mandate of the European Community?

[Crvenkovski] The fact that there is no turning aside from the Lisbon Declaration is something that we have to respect as a positive signal from Edinburgh. Well-experienced people think that the European Community decidedly cannot excuse itself at this moment with respect to the application of the Republic of Macedonia since in this way it would dishonor the word which it expressed at one time in Lisbon and would acknowledge defeat in this way. Therefore, it would be too much to expect such a thing from the European Community.

## Macedonian Military Academy Plans Debated

### Criticism of Plans

93BA0418A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 5-6 Dec 92  
pp 10-11

[Article by Branko Geroski: "'West Point' From the JNA to Pandemonium"]

[Text] *The preparations for establishing a Military Academy of the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia] are proceeding for the time being.*

It appears that work for establishing the Military Academy of the ARM is proceeding well. A central committee that has to carry out all preparations, and that means selecting the required number of personnel and producing an educational plan and program, already has been formed. This committee, which has met once already, in addition to Vice Admiral Dragoljub Botsinov, also includes Academician Dr. Aleksandar Khristov; the provost of Cyril and Methodius University Dr. Aleksandar Stojmilov; Dr. Stojmen Mihajlovski from the Institute for Sociological, Political, and Legal Research; and Dr. Jordan Sjpasovski.

There is also a draft for the educational plan of the Academy criteria and even a competition for selecting the first 12 instructors (nine of them have to be active military personnel). Although these documents are not definitive, evil tongues say that already it is known who "is shooting" for the new professorial positions, that during this academic year a hundred pupils will be enrolled, and that the Academy will start with a proper budget.

**Seemingly "Trifles"**

And all this would be wonderful (and why not, when so many things drag along clumsily in this government?!) if it were not for several "trifles" that spoil the impression. In the first place, it was envisaged, and probably still is envisaged, that the Academy will be founded on the basis of a law. In the title of one of those documents, which already have been placed for the members of the central committee, it is clearly written that it is called upon by such a law. A law which, up to now, does not exist! There is a working version, which still has not passed through the government "filter," let alone reached the parliament. However, this need not be a big problem unless the idea is to "out-race" the law with preliminary work, which is very probable.

The problem is another matter. Namely, when the formation of an institution of such a nature was discussed and when the well-known arguments concerning it were thrashed out, it was said that a chance will be given to all scientific workers who have a desire and indeed have something to say about the creation of the nature of this institution. It was said that some kind of a tribunal would be organized, but up to now there has been nothing at all about this.

Intelligent people invariably have high regard for the capabilities and enthusiasm of Vice Admiral Botsinov, whom they say is pushing this business with romantic enthusiasm (which can be understood only as a compliment). However, the fact is that something new, something untried, is being created, and in these circumstances the good old rule that more heads think better than one applies.

**Experience From the JNA**

When the already prepared statement concerning the educational plan of the Military Academy is examined, it is clear that it contains a lot that needs to be completed and even reconsidered. Even the layman will be surprised when he reads, for example, that the transitional educational plan will be based on the plans and programs of the Military Academy of the KOV [Ground Forces] of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. Which, as it is said, are in agreement with the most recent world knowledge and decisions. In short, teaching in the Military Academy of the ARM will be according to the plan and programs of the schools of the former JNA, "freed" of certain ideologically and politically colored subjects and enriched with some new ones: history of the Macedonian people, ecology, automatic controls.... It is good that they are not experimenting and that foreign experience will be required, but some questions come to mind. Is the former JNA the only army, the educational base which is closest to world experience and knowledge? Is it possible that all the others are just ignored?

The dilemma is not of an ideological nature, although it is reasonable to ask if it is necessary to copy the educational system of a disintegrated army. The dilemma is purely pragmatic. This is why: After the first two years of education in common, the pupils are to be divided into five areas—infantry, artillery, armored-mechanized units, communications, and engineering. Isn't this overly ambitious and

overly cumbersome for a relatively small and at least up to now modestly equipped army?!

**"Backward" Slovenes**

In final analysis, even the basic concept is debatable. It is debatable if in general the republic needs an institution that will produce dozens of officers annually. Because it is known that even today the payroll of the ARM contains enough officers to be able to lead an army several times larger than ours. Won't we find unemployed officers at the employment offices tomorrow?!

For example, in Slovenia, which is much richer, and up to now much luckier than our country, in general they do not plan to open secondary military schools and military academies. The people simply calculated that annually they will need 30 new officers and 100 noncommissioned officers and concluded that it is more efficient to "produce" them with a postgraduate education system. Thus, the noncommissioned officers are "recruited" from the ranks of those who have finished secondary school, who have served their hitch and then have completed a course for squad leaders; and their postgraduate education lasts six months. The officers will be college-educated people with postgraduate education, their postgraduate education lasting 12 months. For higher posts the Slovenes envisioned permanent supplementary schooling.

Don't we have enough of employed architects and builders who in this way can become successful engineers, enough electrical engineers on the street to become good officers in the communications branch, enough machinists without work to become tank operators, and so forth? Nevertheless, the Slovenes did not think up the system that they are using; at one time it was discussed even here. Or perhaps is it thought that the new Slovene officers will be farther from the newest world knowledge and experience than their future Macedonian colleagues?!

**"Logic" and Hypothesis**

Of course, there are people (well-intentioned and not well-intentioned) who will ask: Well then, what is this now, why is the attempt to create our military academy, which will create personnel for our army, being "undermined"? Normally arguments are powerless before such "logic." By the same logic that the former army was "ours" in the same way, unreservedly, with a profound and somewhat untroubled respect toward people in the gray muslin uniform.

There is no purpose in asking such people the following question: Why are we in this amazing rush now, why are we ignoring people who think differently, although they are wrong? Ever since the idea of a Macedonian "West Point" first was mentioned, one's attitude toward it (toward the idea, and not toward the academy!) has been treated as a general attitude for the ARM or against the ARM. With such a hypothesis there is no room for thinking that it is a matter that concerns the very essence of the defense concept of Macedonia. Because those that think that this proposed military academy will lead to inflation of the officers corps, and that nothing good comes from having more officers than is necessary, are not dissuaded. However, there is no

place for pessimism. The concept of the military university that is being discussed now in one way or another will have to go through the "filter" of public discussion in which at least the chronically vociferous laymen and probably the professional part of the public will receive their five minutes. Thus there is hope that soon all arguments, however, will be placed on the table, and perhaps those who have the last word will know how to make an intelligent choice.

[Box, p 10]

**Dean Risto Damjanovski?**

The people who are engaged in the intrigue concerning the plan for forming a Military Academy of the ARM for one reason or another are proposing very different ideas concerning what kind of subjects will be taught, and who will sit in what chair. One of the most vigorous lobby discussions is that concerning the dean of the academy. Thus, it is said that no one other than the former Minister of National Defense, Risto Damjanovski, "is reflecting" about this position.

[Box, p 12]

Won't the Military Academy "produce" personnel for us who will wait at the employment office?

How did the Slovenes proceed?

#### Response to Criticism

93BA0418B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 15 Dec 92  
p 14

[Letter by Efran Kostov, General Staff of the ARM: "Keep the Truth in Mind," written in response to "West Point' From the JNA to Pandemonium," VECER 5 and 6 December]

[Text] It may be concluded from the article that the journalist B.G., the author of the cited title in VECER of 5 and 6 December 1992, is inadequately familiar with the preparations for forming the Military Academy of the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia]. From the article it appears that he read the materials for the first session of the Central Committee. These materials present a proposal for the educational plan for the infantry area of military action as a proposal for discussion as the first point of the agenda. The second point of the agenda deals with the criterion for selecting and reviewing the instructors of the Military Academy, which is in agreement with the law for directed education in the Republic of Macedonia that is in effect. The proposal for the text of the competition for the selection of the first teachers of the Military Academy is given as the third point of discussion. According to the law, the Central Committee, which was made up of eminent professionals, has to present the educational plan of the Military Academy, and select the first five teachers of educational and scientific professions as well as the first five assistants by means of a competition.

The text in VECER, the author of which is Branko Gerovski, was written without a knowledge of the real situation concerning the formation of the Military Academy. Evidently, the author, as well as the other authors who have

written on this subject in VECER, do not have the necessary detailed and correct information concerning that about which they are writing. Possibly, the complete information and reasons concerning that about which they are writing would hinder these authors because this would make it much more difficult to justify their ideas and more difficult to succeed in disinforming and confusing the public.

The text that appeared in VECER of 5 and 6 December 1992, which any reader may note, is not well-intended, and neither is it well-argued, and many of the ideas presented are arbitrary and malicious.

Possibly it is not good here to present "counterarguments" that will contradict the text published by Mr. B.G. Namely, the formation of the Military Academy is closely connected with the Army of the Republic of Macedonia [ARM], which cannot successfully develop and carry out tasks of the defense of the Republic if it does not have an appropriately developed educational system. This problem is fairly complex, and its solution is important for defense, and it is unnecessary to discuss this here in this reaction to a newspaper article in an improved manner. However, a brief review of Mr. B.G.'s text will be made in order to present the truth.

Mr. B.G.'s text contains many falsehoods that may be contradicted easily and reasonably. There is no competition for selecting instructors, as he asserts, but for selecting the first instructors which, according to the law, the Central Committee has to prepare and announce. In general, it is not known who "is pushing" for the new professorial positions, as Mr. B.G. asserts. That which is known is that a competition for all teaching and work positions will be announced in the public media and that the Central Committee will choose the instructors, that is, the educational scientific council of the Military Academy. This refers to all personnel without exception, and to those people who now are working on preparations concerning beginning the work of the Military Academy, but who wish to be involved in instruction. Likewise, instruction in a certain number of subjects will be carried out by the departments in Skopje that have an established teaching staff and laboratory facilities in these subjects.

A hundred pupils will not be enrolled during this academic year, and the Military Academy does not have a budget, as Mr. B.G. asserts. The truth is that continuing education of the students who left the military academies of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] will be organized. These students, in whose education even our republic has invested great material resources up to now, have acquired solid military knowledge that needs to be given final form to become practically useful in the defense system of the Republic of Macedonia, by training in the Military Academy of the ARM.

In the materials presented to the Central Committee there is no verified document that refers to the law, which does not exist or which is not in force, and Mr. B.G. may assure himself of that if he wishes.

In the subheading "Experience From the JNA" it is asserted simply that teaching in the Military Academy of the ARM



will be according to the plan and program of the former JNA. However, the truth is that the Military Academy of the ARM still does not have an educational plan and program [EPP]. All EPP's that were available up to now here in Skopje have been studied. This refers to the EPP of the VTA [expansion unknown] in Zagreb in 1982, the EPP of the Institute of Defense of the Department of Philosophy in Skopje, the EPP of the Military Academy of the KOV [Ground Forces] in Belgrade of 1990, and the EPP of the Military Academy of the KOV in the United States [as published] of 1972. Likewise, the military school systems of the Bulgarian People's Army [NBA] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] have been studied. A comparative analysis of the educational plans has been carried out and the results are given in the proposal for forming a military academy of the ARM. Mr. B.G. may look at these results if he wishes.

A version of the educational plan for training in the Military Academy of the ARM only for the infantry area has been developed on the basis of all this, and this has been provided for discussion, but not as a final decision. According to the law, the Central Committee will submit the educational plan for work in the Military Academy.

What fields will be taught in the Military Academy and what number of students will be taught will depend on the planned requirements for the defense of the Republic of Macedonia and not on the wishes of the units or a group in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia or outside of it. Nothing will be overly ambitious and overly cumbersome, as Mr. B.G. asserts.

The Military Academy of the ARM will not train dozens of officers, as is asserted in the heading "'Backward' Slovenes"—only that which is necessary to fill in empty places in the formations. The experience of the Slovenes and their decisions concerning the military school system are not applicable in our condition, and here Mr. B.G. has chosen a false example. Slovenia is in a very different environment, a very different military-political and strategic situation, and possibly does not have to form its own academy if it can train its officers nearby, but this does not apply to the Republic of Macedonia.

Our unemployed architects, builders, electrical engineers, machinists, and others, as Mr. B.G. asserts, can become good engineers, communications officers, tank operators, and so forth. However, Mr. B.G. does not say that these people have to acquire specialized military knowledge concerning military duties in the ARM in some school that has the appropriate educational plan and program, a teaching staff, and developed material-teaching base. In what school, Mr. B.G., if not in the military school system of the ARM, i.e. in the Military Academy of the ARM, or perhaps do you think somewhere outside the borders of our Republic?

It is clear from what is presented in Mr. B.G.'s article that his style of writing is to put forth partial statements and partial truths and thus to deceive the public; clearly he does not express his true intention.

Everything that has been done up to now, and the activities that are in progress, must make it possible to begin the work

of the Military Academy in accordance with the proposed plan. Everything connected with the formation of the Military Academy of the ARM is in agreement with the laws in effect in the Republic of Macedonia.

The journalist B.G. may request all of the relevant information from the source and inform the public objectively about what is written.

The process of forming the Military Academy, that is the concept of training the officers corps, is open to everyone who wishes to make their contribution. Thus, besides (not) well-informed criticisms, a new idea will be welcomed, treated in a reasonable manner, and reported to an appropriate place. This place is the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the ARM, or the Department of Education of the General Staff of the ARM.

Every idea or concept of training the officer personnel for the needs of the ARM may be presented publicly before eminent specialists of the Army and the University of Skopje. The Department of Education of the General Staff of the ARM, which is working on the concept of forming the Military Academy of the ARM without reservation, will be committed to organizing meetings at which such ideas and concepts will be presented.

Before the final adoption of the concept for training the officers personnel and defining the educational plans and programs, as well as a number of other questions, the Central Committee will organize a discussion on this subject in which all interested parties and authorities (Ministry of Defense, General Staff of the ARM, Institute of Defense of the Philosophy Department, Ministry of Education and Physical Culture, and others) will participate.

All assertions that this is a matter of a "monster" are unfounded, without facts and analyses, and are extremely harmful and are intended to disinform the public.

#### \* Electricity Concerns in Macedonia Analyzed

##### \* Albanian, Bulgarian Connections

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[Article by S. Padori: "East-West for Security"]

[Text] *Subject for today—in what direction will electric power engineering in Macedonia be developed?*

*In a situation of isolation from the European electric system, the new connections with Albania and Bulgaria, which will be alternatives and will provide security of operation of the Macedonian system, must have priority.*

*The discussions with Albania up to now have been successful, but the economic study concerning the interconnection will show how much the construction of the 90-km 220-kV network will be justified.*

*Whether a hydro facility will be built is unknown, but the Varda Valley study should provide a unique guidepost for future investment.*

During these times of poverty, blockades, and undefined legal regulations, not only is it hard for the development of power engineering to achieve the strategic position, which as a rule it should have, but simply the long-term neglect entirely destroys the assumptions which were sketched out in the past. However, truthfully, the responsible agencies from the past government departments did not "wander around" a lot looking for something to do concerning power engineering. Except for the Studies for Development of Power Engineering up to the year 2005 of this Republic, which the Institute of the EMO developed five whole years ago, in practice, nothing "fresher" has been prepared operationally. In fact, three years ago an attempt was made to prepare a certain program for priority construction, but taking account of the fact that the study was used as the basis, and, simply speaking, all parameters in it were invalid, they "threw up their hands" against preparing this document.

Again, since last year we have had a completely new situation in the functioning of our government. We are independent, and many projections made during this past decade, which, it was thought, would contribute to the development of power engineering (for example, the investment of \$1 million in the Kosovo powerplants) simply fell into the water. The economy and the state are left only with the alternative of deciding to invest in this strategic branch of industry themselves, which in the conditions in which we find ourselves are in some way priorities irrespective of how many funds (which we do not have) need to be invested....

#### Secure Connections

When we speak about priority investments in power engineering, at this time we are not thinking about building hydroelectric plants, as much as we need them, but, first of all, about reestablishing secure connections with the neighboring electric power systems. If up to last year the electric power system of Macedonia functioned within the framework of the Yugoslav system, according to the divisions, the result was a unique kind of isolationism. As the Director for Development and Investments in the Electrical Economy of Macedonia *Gligor Micajkov* says, we must not allow ourselves to be disconnected and without alternative directions, which is the case with the railroads or the inadequate highway transportation in the direction of Bulgaria and Albania.

"The Albanian electrical department is interested in cooperation and building a 90-km 220-kV connection with Macedonia. The preliminary discussions concluded in favor of a joint project, but first it will be necessary to prepare an economic study to see how much all this will cost. In parallel with this, efforts will be made to reestablish a parallel system with Bulgaria. At the present time only a 110-kV connection from Petrich to Strumitsa is functioning, but the experts have declared this to be an 'island' system, and it does not offer guarantees of security of the overall system. Reestablishing the connections with the eastern and western systems is of great significance because of the very nature of electric systems, which function best and most securely as a whole when they cover a more extensive area. Disadvantages may occur because it is much more efficient to provide

for alternative sources, and therefore, in my opinion, building these connections has to have priority above everything else, irrespective of the fact that today everything is expensive," *Gligor Micajkov* emphasized.

#### New Qualities

The fact that this Republic needs new energy capacities also was emphasized at the Conference of Engineers, which was held in Mavrovo. However, under the present economic conditions, in fact, is it worthwhile to predict how it is most intelligent to start? While one group of engineers are arguing for maximum improvement, which according to them will ensure satisfying consumption even without new building, taking account of the fact that for two years natural gas has been expected to arrive, others think that a hydroelectric plant has to be built. In the meantime, what is the particular problem?

Does Skopje need the "Kozjak" powerplant, which does not have a particularly large energy capacity, or again the "Gradec" plant, which will be inadequate, but its design is somewhat interesting. "Boshkov Most" and "Lukovo Pole" are "in play," and even the startup of the Varda Valley Project, which, according to *Micajkov*, the power industry supported from the beginning—data which the development sector had at its disposal were used, and the most powerful members of the consortium are representatives and employees in the electrical power industry of Macedonia.

"In fact, the completion of the feasibility study will be of great use for the future development of power engineering. The French partners have experience in this area, and it will be useful for Macedonia to see how everything would appear, how it would be done, and if it would pay to invest in it because there will be little gain if enormous funds are committed and then it turns that the investments are too expensive! In my opinion, in order to enter into the implementation of such a project, in addition to the electric department, let us say the main supporters of a certain consortium have to be the hydrology enterprises because as future users it is precisely they who would be directly connected and would be interested in such a complex," *Micajkov* emphasized.

#### \* Costs Analyzed

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[Article by S. Padori: "Kilowatts With Additions!"]

[Text] *The bills for the past month have been calculated with the October decision for a price rise, however, everyone is surprised at the amounts.*

*The current bill, in three parts: basic, power part (one-third of the basic), and the transmission tax.*

*The bills are greatest for those who heat with electricity.*

#### Why Do the Electric Bills Continue To Increase?

In the case of the latest correction for electrical energy in the middle of October, although amounts of 48.13 denars per



kilowatt hour were obtained, in the personal bills of the citizens, someone it occurred to us that on the average more than 35,000 denars would have to be put aside monthly for power consumption! Now, when the collectors have passed through the monthly "serve," just when the financiers made the current accounts easier for us, somehow we found that we are paying a lot for electricity...

### Price From Three Items

The price per kilowatt hour which we pay in our bills, basically consists of three parts: the base, the power part, which is one-third of the base, and the standard transmission tax which the state collects, for electricity as well as for all other commodities, and which is 0.3 percent of the total amount of the base and the power. How this formation of the price looks in practice is shown by the example of the value of the expensive kilowatt hour which the consumers pay for with double tariff meters.

The base for the expensive kilowatt hour is 35.05 denars. The power part is added to this amount, so that the base is multiplied by 1.33 and a value of 46.73 denars is obtained. The tax is added to this (another multiplication by 0.3) and the final value of 48.13 denars is obtained. The principle for the inexpensive kilowatt hour is the same, with the double tariffs the base is 28.05, with the power the amount is increased to 33.28 denars, and the final value which the consumers pay (with all tax) is 33.98 denars, again those who have only a single tariff meter pay the base rate of 28.05 denars, together with the calculated power 37.40 denars, and finally with the calculated tax per kilowatt hour it is necessary to pay 38.52 denars per kilowatt hour.

### Broiling Hot Heating

The astronomical price per kilowatt hour particularly shocks those households that are heated by electricity. The use of thermal heaters on the average "swallowed" from 720 to 1500 kilowatt hours (only for heating). The amounts differ depending on the power of the heating elements, under the condition of using exclusively the inexpensive tariff monthly. The calculations that we made had to take into account the fact that they refer to a period of this year which, on the average, is not characterized by temperatures under zero, which means that the heating in such conditions requires much more energy (and money) than are registered now.

For all categories of consumers we tentatively took into account the fact that they consume 300 kilowatt hours each of expensive energy. The inexpensive energy is taken as variable depending on whether the rooms are heated with 3-, 4-, 5-, or 6-kW heaters. For 300 kilowatt hours of expensive electricity monthly it is necessary to pay 14,439.00 denars. If 720 kilowatt hours, which a 3-MV heater consumes, is added to this amount—17,265.60 denars, then the monthly "bill" is 31,704.60 denars. Again, those with a "sixth" which monthly swallows 1500 kilowatt hours each at the inexpensive tariff, together with the above-mentioned 300 kilowatt hours of expensive current, will have to pay even 49,409.00 denars monthly!

All households which will be heated with electric energy this winter need neither the electric company nor the newspapers to "convince" them of efficient consumption. According to the November "universal" amounts in the course of this month, it is sure that many more will consider carefully what to turn on and when to do it, so that their own pocket will be the best guideline and system for efficiency and economy. Nevertheless, what has been insisted upon and sought for a long time—the electrical company of Macedonia!?